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THE

COMMENTARIES OF CÆSAR

ON

HIS WARS IN GAUL:

LITERALLY TRANSLATED

According to the TEXT of

PRENDEVILLE.

New Edition.

CORRECTED AND REVISED BY

A GRADUATE OF THE UNIVERSITY.

WITH A MEMOIR.

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THE

LIFE AND WRITINGS OF CÆSAR.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR, son of C. J. Cæsar and Aurelia, was born on the 12th of July, B. C. 100, in the consulship of C. Marius and L. Valerius Flaccus, and consequently was six years younger than Pompey and Cicero. In his 13th year he was elected "*Flamen Dialis*" through the interest of the great Marius, who had married Julia, Cæsar's aunt. In his 17th year he married Cossutia, a wealthy heiress of the equestrian order, whom he shortly afterwards divorced, and married Cornelia, daughter of L. Cinna.

So open a declaration in favour of the popular party provoked the anger of Sulla, who, upon his return to Rome, B. C. 82, ordered Cæsar to put away Cornelia; but he refused, and was therefore deprived of his priesthood. He now withdrew from Rome to Asia, B. C. 81, where he served his first campaign, under M. Minucius Thermus, at the siege of Mitylene. He particularly distinguished himself at this siege, and was rewarded with a civic crown for saving the life of a fellow-soldier. He next served under P. Sulpicius in Cilicia, B. C. 78, but upon hearing of the death of Sulla, immediately returned to Rome.

In B. C. 68, he obtained the quæstorship; in this yea *he lost his* aunt Julia (widow of Marius), and his o *wife Cornelia*, over both of whom he pronounced fun

orations in the forum. After the funeral of his wife, he went to farther Spain, as Quæstor to Antistius Vetus.

On his return to Rome, B. C. 67, he married Pompeia, daughter of Q. Pompeius Rufus and Cornelia; which marriage was intended to cement more closely his union with Pompey.

In B. C. 64, he was appointed to preside, in place of the Prætor, as "*Judex Quæstionis*," at trials for murder; and in B. C. 63, he was elected "*Pontifex Maximus*." He was soon after elected Prætor for the following year. At the expiration of his prætorship, he obtained the province of farther Spain, B. C. 61, but, on account of his debts, did not set out till the following summer. He began his campaign by subduing the mountainous tribes of Lusitania, taking Brigantium, a town of the Gallæci, and gaining several other advantages.

He returned to Rome in the summer of B. C. 60, and became candidate for the consulship, to which he was elected, having as colleague, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, a man of the opposite party. But to prevent Cæsar from obtaining a province in which he might distinguish himself, the Senate assigned as provinces, to the Consuls elect, the care of the woods and public pastures. It was *not till after* his election that he entered into that coalition with Pompey and M. Crassus, which is known by the name of the first triumvirate. This first triumvirate, therefore, was merely an agreement among the three most powerful men at Rome; and the agreement remained a secret, till the proceedings of Cæsar in his consulship showed that he was supported by a power, against which it was vain for his enemies to struggle.

The first act of Cæsar after his entering on office, was *to render the Senate more* amenable to public opinion, *by causing its proceedings* to be taken down and pub-

lished daily. His next step was to propose an agrarian law: his colleague Bibulus opposed it; but was driven from the forum by force of arms, and the law was carried: this law granted allotments of land to 20,000 citizens, among whom were a great many of Pompey's veterans.

About this time Cæsar united himself still more closely to Pompey, by giving him in marriage his daughter Julia, who had been betrothed to Servilius Cæpio; and he himself married Calpurnia, daughter of L. Piso, who was Consul in the following year.

He induced the tribune Vatinius to propose a bill to the people, granting him the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with three legions, for five years. This was of course passed, and the senate added the province of Transalpine Gaul, with another legion, for five years also.

During the next nine years, from B. C. 58, Cæsar was engaged in the subjugation of Gaul. In this time he conquered all transalpine Gaul, except the part called Provincia: he twice crossed the Rhine, and twice landed in Britain, which had hitherto been unknown to the Romans.

The death of Crassus in the Parthian war, B.C. 53, had left Cæsar and Pompey alone at the head of the state. But the brilliant success of Cæsar in Gaul excited the envy of Pompey, who saw with mortification that he was now becoming the second person in the state. A civil war ensued, in which Pompey was finally overthrown, and Cæsar became master of the Roman empire, which embraced the greater part of the then *known world.*

The conspiracy against Cæsar's life was set on foo *in the beginning* of the year B. C. 44, by Cassius, a

sixty senators joined in the plot. Personal hatred and party spirit seem to have been the only motives of Cassius and most of the others. Many of them had taken an active part in the war against Cæsar, whom he had not only forgiven, but had also raised to offices of rank and honour; nevertheless, these very men were the assassins of their benefactor! Cæsar disregarding the warnings that had been given him, went to the Senate-house. He was assailed by the conspirators, and after having received twenty-three wounds, fell at the base of Pompey's statue. He died in the 56th year of his life, and 44th before the Christian era. By this impolitic measure the conspirators involved the city in consternation and terror, which produced general anarchy, and paved the way for the revolution which they wished to prevent, the monarchical government being actually founded on the murder of Julius Cæsar.

The energy of Cæsar's character—his personal accomplishments and courage—his talents for war—and his capacity for civil affairs—combine to render him one of the most remarkable men of any age. Though a lover of pleasure, and a man of licentious habits, he never neglected what was a matter of business. He began that active career which has immortalized his name, when he was forty years of age—a time of life when ordinary men's powers of enterprize are deadened or extinguished. As a writer and an orator he has received the highest praise from Cicero; his COMMENTARIES on the WARS IN GAUL were written immediately after the several battles, and on the spot where each was fought; the composition is in a plain, perspicuous style, entirely free from all affectation, and places him in the same class with Xenophon, and those few individuals who have successfully united the pursuit of letters and

philosophy, with the business of active life. This valuable work was almost lost during the battle in the bay of Alexandria, when Cæsar, being obliged to leap from a sinking ship, swam 200 paces to the fleet, all the while holding, it is said, his Commentaries in his left hand and his coat of mail in his teeth. His projects were vast and magnificent; he seems to have formed designs far beyond what the ability of one man could execute, or the longest life could expect to see realised. His reform of the Roman calendar, under the direction of Sosigenes, and his intended consolidation of the then almost unmanageable body of Roman law, do credit to his judgment. He established public libraries, and gave to the learned Varro the care of collecting and arranging the books. Of the eight books of his Commentaries, the last is said to have been completed by some other hand. The three books of the Civil War were written by Cæsar; but the single books on the Alexandrine, African, and Spanish wars, respectively, are generally attributed to Hirtius, though it is not at all unlikely that Cæsar left the materials behind him. He wrote a number of other works, the publication of which Augustus suppressed.

The historian PLINY says of him, that he could, at the same time, employ his *ears* to listen, his *eyes* to read, his *hand* to write, and his *mind* to dictate.

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CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

ON

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

THE *division* into *paragraphs*, of this TRANSLATION, is in accordance with THE TEXT as given in PRENDEVILLE'S edition.

BOOK I.

I. ALL Gaul is divided into three parts; whereof the Belgæ inhabit one; the Aquitani another; those who in their own language are called Celtæ, but in ours Galli, inhabit the third. These all differ from one another in language, customs, and laws. The river Garonne divides the Gauls from the Aquitani, the Marne and Seine divide them from the Belgæ. Of all these the Belgæ are the bravest: because they are farthest distant from the culture and refinement of the province, and merchants do not often trade with them, and bring in those things which tend to effeminate their minds, and they are next neighbours to the Germans, who live beyond the Rhine, with whom they wage war perpetually: for which reason, the Helvetii also excel the rest of the Gauls in courage, because almost in daily conflicts they are contending with the Germans

whilst either they keep them off from their own territories, or themselves make war in their dominions. Of these countries one part, which we said the Gauls possess, takes its beginning at the river Rhone, is bounded by the Garonne, the Atlantic ocean, and the confines of the Belgæ; it reaches also on the side of the Sequani and Helvetii to the river Rhine, and stretches toward the North. The Belgæ commence at the extreme confines of Gaul; extend to the lower part of the river Rhine; and face toward the North, and the rising Sun. Aquitania extends from the river Garonne, to the Pyrenæan mountains, and that part of the Ocean which is toward Spain; and bears betwixt the setting of the Sun and the North.

II. Orgetorix was by far the person of highest birth and greatest riches among the Helvetii. He, M. Messala, and M. Piso, being consuls, prompted by the love of sovereign power, formed a combination among the nobility, and persuaded the people to remove out of their own country with all their substance: (telling them,) it was very easy for them, since they excelled all the states in valour, to seize the government of all Gaul. To this he persuaded them the more easily, because the Helvetii are confined on all sides by the situation of their country, on one side by the Rhine, a very broad and very deep river, which divides the country of the Helvetii from the Germans; on another side by Jura, a very high mountain, which is situate betwixt the Sequani and the Helvetii; on the third, by the lake Lemannus, and the river Rhone, which di-

vides our province from the Helvetii. By this means it happened, both that they could spread less extensively, and could less easily make war upon their neighbours; on which account the people, naturally fond of war, were affected with great grief. But in proportion to the number of inhabitants, and on account of their reputation for war and bravery, they thought they had a confined country, which extended but 240 miles in length, and 180 in breadth.

III. Induced by these things, and persuaded by the influence of Orgetorix, they resolved to provide those things that were requisite for the expedition; to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts of burden and of cars, to make as great sowings as possible, that they might have plenty of corn in their journey, and to renew a peace and alliance with the neighbouring states. Two years time they thought would be sufficient for them to complete these preparations; they fix their departure for the third year by a law. Orgetorix is chosen to arrange these things. He, when he undertook an embassy to the states, in this journey persuades Casticus, the son of Catamantaledes, a Sequan, whose father had held the sovereignty among the Sequani for many years, and had been called friend by the senate and people of Rome, to assume in his own state the regal power, which his father formerly had held: and he likewise persuades Dumnorix the Æduan, the brother of Divitiacus, *who at that* time held the office of chief magis*trate in the* state, and was greatly beloved by *the people,* to attempt the same thing; and giv

him his daughter in marriage. He proves to them, that it would be very easy to perform their attempt; for that he himself would have the command of his own state, and there was no question but that of all Gaul the Helvetii were the most powerful: he assures them, that he himself with his own forces, and with his own army, would procure kingdoms for them. Drawn over by this speech, they give a promise and oath to one another, and hope that upon assuming the regal power, they would be able to make themselves masters of all Gaul by means of these three most powerful and intrepid nations.

IV. As soon as this design, by means of a discovery, was made known to the Helvetii, they obliged Orgetorix, according to their custom, to plead his cause in chains. It was necessary that the punishment, that he should be burned alive, should overtake him if condemned. Upon the day appointed for the trial, Orgetorix brought together from all parts to the place of trial, all his slaves, being about 10,000 men; to the same place he likewise brought all his dependants and debtors, of which he had a great number: by means of these he rescued himself from the trial. When the state, enraged at this conduct, were endeavouring to execute their law by force of arms, and the magistrates were collecting a great number of men out of the country for this purpose, Orgetorix died: nor was there wanting ground of suspicion, as the Helvetii imagine, that he had an active hand in his own death.

V. After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless endeavour to execute that which they had con-

certed, namely, to remove out of their own country. When now they thought themselves to be prepared for this purpose, they set fire to all their cities, being twelve in number, to their villages in number four hundred, and to the private houses that remained; they burn all their corn, except what they were to carry with them; to the end, that all hopes of returning home being cut off, they might be the more disposed to undergo all dangers: they order every one to carry for themselves from home a quantity of ground corn sufficient for three months. They persuade their neighbours the Rauraci and Tulingi and Latobrigi, that, having adopted the same design, and having burned their cities and villages, they should go along with them: and they attach to themselves, as companions, received to them, the Boji, who had dwelt beyond the Rhine, and had passed over into the territory of Noricum, and had besieged the city Noreia.

VI. There were but two ways, by which they could go out of their country: one through the country of the Sequani, very narrow and difficult, betwixt the mountain Jura and the river Rhone, by which carts, one by one, could scarcely pass; and a very high mountain hung over it in such a manner, that a very few men could easily have stopped them: the other lay through our province, much easier, and shorter; because that the Rhone runs betwixt the confines of the Helvetii and the Allobroges, who had but lately been subdued (by the Romans,) and it, in several places, is passable by a ford. Geneva is a frontier city of the Allobroges, and is next to t

borders of the Helvetii. From this city a bridge reaches over to the Helvetii. Now they imagined they would either persuade the Allobroges, because they did not yet appear to be of a disposition well affected toward the Roman people, or oblige them by force, to suffer them to march through their country. All things being provided for their journey, they appoint a day on which they should all meet upon the banks of the Rhone. The day was the fifth day before the Kalends of April, in the consulship of L. Piso and A. Gabinius.

VII. When it was told Cæsar, that they designed to take their route through our province, he makes all haste to be gone from the city, and, by very great marches, posts away for the further Gaul, and arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole province (to furnish) as great a number of troops as possible (for there was in further Gaul only one legion), and commands that the bridge which was at Geneva should be cut down. When the Helvetii were informed of his arrival, they send several persons of the highest quality in their state, ambassadors to him; in which embassy Numeius and Verudoctius had the chief place; who were to acquaint him, that they intended to march through the province, without doing any harm, because they had no other way (to prosecute their journey): and they begged that they might be allowed to do this by his permission. Cæsar, as he kept in mind that L. Cassius the consul had been slain, and his army routed by the Helvetii, and made to pass under the yoke, was not of opinion that this should be granted: nor

did he think, that people of a hostile disposition, upon liberty of marching through the province being allowed them, could abstain from outrages and mischief. However, that time might be gained, till the forces, which he had ordered to be raised, should get together, he told the ambassadors, that he would take time to consider the matter: if they wanted any thing of him, they might return the day preceding the Ides of April.

VIII. In the mean time, with the legion which he had with him, and the soldiers, who had come from the province, he draws, along the banks of the Rhone, from the lake Lemannus, which falls into the river Rhone, to the mountain Jura, which divides the country of the Sequani from the Helvetii, a wall ten miles long and sixteen feet in height, and a ditch. This work being finished, he plants guards, and strengthens the forts, that he might the more easily stop them, if they should endeavour to break through contrary to his inclination. When the day, which he had fixed upon with the ambassadors, was come, and the ambassadors returned to him, he says that he could not, in consistency with the custom and practice of the Roman people, grant a passage to any through the province; and, if they should endeavour to use force, he gave them to understand that he would hinder them. The Helvetii being baulked in this hope, endeavoured, sometimes by day but oftener by night, if they could force a passage with ships joined together, and a great many rafts made; others by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of the river was least: but being repulsed by the fortifications

the work and the concourse of the soldiers, and by the darts, they desisted from their attempt.

IX. One way was left, viz. through the country of the Sequani, by which, contrary to the inclination of the Sequani, they could not pass by reason of its narrowness. And as they could not prevail with them by their own interest, they dispatch deputies to Dumnorix the Æduan, that through him, as an intercessor, they might obtain this favour from the Sequani. Dumnorix by his compliance and generosity had great influence among the Sequani, and was a friend to the Helvetii: because from their country he had married the daughter of Orgetorix: led on too by a fond desire for sovereign power, he was plotting a revolution, and therefore inclined to have as many states as possible laid under obligations to him by acts of kindness. Wherefore he undertakes the business; and prevails with the Sequani to permit the Helvetii to pass through their country; and arranged that they should deliver hostages to each other: the Sequani, that they should not interrupt the Helvetii in their march; and the Helvetii, that they should pass without offering molestation and abuse to the country.

X. Word is again brought to Cæsar, that the Helvetii designed to take their route through the territories of the Sequani and Ædui into the country of the Santones, who are not far from the borders of the Tolosates, who are a people in the province. If this should happen, he was sensible that it would be to the great danger of the province, to have a warlike people, and enemies to the people of Rome, next neighbours to

an open and very plentiful country. For these reasons he set his lieutenant T. Labienus over the fortifications which he had erected. He himself posts away by great marches into Italy; and there raises two legions, and draws out of their winter quarters three, who were wintering about Aquileja, and with these five legions hastens to march by the nearest road over the Alps into further Gaul. There the Sentrones, and Graioceli, and Caturiges, having possessed themselves of the higher ground, endeavoured to stop his army in their march. But, these being routed in several battles, he came in seven days from Ocelum, which is the furthest town of the hither province, into the country of the Vocontii, who are a people of the further province; after that he came into the country of the Allobroges; from the Allobroges he led his army into the country of the Segusiani: these are the first without the province beyond the Rhone.

XI. The Helvetii by this time had carried their forces through the straits, and the territories of the Sequani, and had come into the dominions of the Ædui, and were ravaging their country. The Ædui, as they were not able to defend themselves and their possessions against them, send deputies to Cæsar to beg assistance; alleging, that at all times they had so deserved of the Roman people, that their country ought not to be laid waste, their children led into captivity, and their towns taken, almost in sight of our army. At the same time, the Ambarri, friends and relatives of the Ædui, inform Cæsar, th they not without difficulty withstood the eff

of the enemy against their towns, now that the country was laid waste. The Allobroges likewise, who had farms and possessions beyond the Rhone, flee to Cæsar, and assure him, that nothing was left them but the soil of their lands. With which proceedings Cæsar being moved, resolved not to wait till the Helvetii, after destroying all the possessions of his allies, should arrive among the Santoni.

XII. The Arar is a river which runs through the confines of the Ædui and the Sequani into the Rhone, with incredible smoothness, so that it cannot be determined by the eye, which way it flows: over this the Helvetii were passing on floats and in boats coupled together. When Cæsar by his scouts was informed, that the Helvetii had now carried over this river three parts of their forces, but that the fourth part remained on this side of the river Arar; he marched out of his camp with three legions about the third watch, and came up with that party who had not yet crossed the river. Falling upon these embarrassed, and not expecting such an attack, he slaughtered a great part of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and hid themselves in the neighbouring woods. This was called the Tigurine canton; for the whole Helvetian state was divided into four cantons. This one canton, leaving their country, in the memory of our fathers, had cut off L. Cassius the consul, and made his army pass under the yoke. Thus, whether by chance, or by the providence of the immortal Gods, that part of the Helvetian state, which had given a remarkable stroke to the Roman people, first

suffered punishment. In which action Cæsar revenged not only public, but also private injuries, because the Tigurini had killed the lieutenant-general L. Piso, the grandfather of L. Piso, his father-in-law, in the same battle, in which they had slain Cassius.

XIII. This skirmish being ended, that he might pursue the remaining forces of the Helvetii, he causes a bridge to be made upon the Arar, and so carries over his army. The Helvetii being surprised at his sudden arrival, as they understood he had performed in one day, a thing which they with great difficulty had accomplished in twenty days, viz. the crossing the river, send ambassadors to him; in which embassy, the chief person was Divico, who had been general of the Helvetii, in the war against Cassius. He discourses with Cæsar to this effect: "If the Roman people would conclude a peace with the Helvetii, the Helvetii would go to that quarter, and there abide where Cæsar should settle them, and order them to be; but if he should persist to harass them by war, he ought to remember both the Roman people's former disaster, and the ancient bravery of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one canton at unawares, when those who had crossed the river, could not bring assistance to their friends; he ought not, on this account, either to ascribe much to his own valour, or despise them. They had learned from their fathers and ancestors, to contend by gallant conduct, rather than by trick or depend upon stratagems. Wherefore he ought not to cause, that the place where they

encamped should obtain a name from an overthrow of the Roman people and the destruction of his army, or transmit the memory thereof to posterity."

XIV. To this Cæsar answered thus: "That he was under the less hesitation what to do, because he well remembered those things which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned: and that he took them more amiss, the less they had been occasioned by the behaviour of the Roman people, who if they had been conscious to themselves of practising any injustice, would have been under no difficulty to guard against them; but were trepanned, because they were not sensible of any thing committed by them, why they should be afraid; and did not think they ought to fear danger without a reason. And though he were inclinable to forget the former offence; could he also drop the remembrance of fresh insolences, that, in opposition to him, they had by force attempted a passage through the province, that they had harrassed the Ædui, the Ambarri, and Allobroges? That they boasted so proudly of their victory, and that they wondered they had borne with ill usage so long without taking vengeance, tended to the same thing. For the immortal Gods used to grant sometimes greater prosperity and longer continued impunity to those, whom they had a mind to punish for their wickedness, that such persons, upon a change of circumstances, might be the more grievously afflicted. Though these things were so, yet if hostages were given to him by them, that he would know they would

perform the things which they promised; and if they would satisfy the Ædui for the outrages they had committed upon them and their allies, also if they would satisfy the Allobroges on the same account, he would conclude a peace with them." Divico replied: "That the Helvetii had been so trained up by their ancestors, that they had been in use to receive, not to give hostages: of this the Roman people were an evidence." This answer being given, he departed.

XV. The day following they decamp from that place. Cæsar does the same, and sends all his horse before, to the number of four thousand, which he had got together from all parts of the province, and from among the Ædui and their allies; who were to observe, toward what quarter they directed their march. Who pursuing too keenly the rear of the army, came to a battle with the Helvetian horse on disadvantageous ground; and a few of our men were killed. Upon which skirmish the Helvetii being puffed up, because with five hundred horse they had repulsed such a number of cavalry, began to halt on their march with greater confidence, and now and then from the rear of their army provoke our men to battle. Cæsar restrained his men from fighting, and thought it sufficient for the present to keep the enemy from plundering, foraging, and ravaging the country. They continued their march for about fifteen days, in such manner, that there was not above five *or six miles* betwixt the enemies' rear and our *van.*

XVI. In the mean time Cæsar from day to d-

was pressing the Ædui for the corn which they had promised in the name of their state, for by reason of the cold, because Gaul is situated toward the North, as was before observed, not only the corn on the fields was not ripe, but indeed there was not a large enough quantity of forage for the horse. But he could not make use of the corn which he had brought up the river Arar by shipping, because the Helvetii, with whom he was unwilling to part, had directed their march away from the Arar. The Ædui put off from day to day, told him they were gathering it up, bringing it together, that it was just ready. When he found that he was put off longer, and that the day was just at hand, on which he must needs measure out the corn to the soldiers; convening their great men, a considerable number of whom he had in the camp, and among these Divitiacus, and Liscus, who had the chief authority, (him the Ædui called Vergobretus, who is elected yearly, and among his own people has the power of life and death) he severely reprimands them: because he had not been supplied by them with corn, when it could neither be bought nor got in the fields, in a time of such need, and the enemy being so near; especially as he had undertaken the war, being induced to it in a great measure by their entreaties; and much more heavily complains, that he was abandoned by them.

XVII. Then at last Liscus, being moved by *Cæsar's speech, declares* openly what he had kept *secret before:* "That there were some persons, *whose authority* was of very great influence

among the people, who could do more in a private capacity than the magistrates themselves; that these by seditious and wicked insinuations terrified the people, so that they did not collect the corn which they ought to make good: because they said that if at present they could not obtain the empire of Gaul themselves, it was better to bear the government of the Gauls than the Romans, nor ought they to doubt but the Romans, if they conquered the Helvetii, would deprive the Ædui, together with the rest of Gaul, of their liberty. That by the same persons our designs, and what passed in the camp, were notified to the enemy; and that they could not be restrained by him. And further, because, being obliged by necessity, he had discovered the matter to Cæsar, that he well knew with how great danger he had done it: and for that reason had concealed it, as long as he could."

XVIII. Cæsar perceived by this speech of Liscus, that Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was pointed at; but because he did not incline those things should be talked of in the presence of many, he immediately dismisses the council, and retains Liscus. He asks him apart about those things, which he had said in the meeting. He tells him the story with greater freedom, and more assurance; he inquires about the same things privately at others, and finds them to be true: That this was Dumnorix, a man of great spirit, in high favour with the people on account of his generosity, fond of a revolution, and who had farmed at a low rate for several years th

customs, and all the other taxes of the Ædui: because that, when he was bidding for them, nobody dare bid in opposition to him. By this means he had both increased his private fortune, and acquired a great deal of wealth to serve the purposes of bribery; he constantly maintained a great number of horsemen at his own charge, and kept them about him: nor was his influence great only at home, but also among the neighbouring states, and for the sake of promoting his interest, he had married his mother among the Bituriges, to a man of very high birth and great power there; he himself had his wife from among the Helvetii: and had married his sister by the mother's side, and his kinswomen, into other states. He favoured and wished well to the Helvetii, on account of this affinity: he hated Cæsar and the Romans, even on his own account; because by their arrival in Gaul his power was lessened, and his brother Divitiacus restored to his former place of favour and dignity. If any thing disastrous should happen to the Romans, he would have the highest expectation of obtaining a throne by means of the Helvetii: whereas under the government of the Roman people he not only despaired of a throne but even of keeping the authority which he had. Cæsar also found, that when the cavalry battle was lost a few days before, the beginning of the flight had been made by Dumnorix and his horse; (for Dumnorix commanded the horse which the Ædui had sent to Cæsar for his assistance) and that by their

flying off, the rest of the cavalry had been terrified.

XIX. Which things being examined into, and to these presumptions there being added some very certain facts; namely, that he had brought the Helvetii through the country of the Sequani; that he had caused mutual hostages to be given; that he had done all this not only without Cæsar's order and that of the state, but even without their knowledge; and that he was blamed by Liscus, the chief magistrate of the Ædui; Cæsar thought this sufficient reason why he should either inflict punishment upon him himself, or order the state to bring him to a trial. One thing stood in the way of all this; namely, that he had had proof of the firm attachment of his brother Divitiacus to the Roman people, of his great affection toward himself, of his singular fidelity, justice, and moderation; for he was afraid, lest, by punishing him, he should alienate the affection of Divitiacus. Wherefore Cæsar, before he would attempt any thing, orders Divitiacus to be called, and, setting aside his ordinary interpreters, holds a conference with him, by means of C. Valerius Procillus, a grandee of the Roman province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance, and in whom he reposed the highest confidence in everything; Cæsar at once puts him in mind of what had been said concerning Dumnorix, whilst Divitiacus himself was present, in the council of the Gauls, and informs him what *every one* apart had said to him about him. *He begs,* and entreats, that, without offence to *him, he might* either pass sentence upon hir

himself, after bringing him to a trial, or order the state of the Ædui to do it.

XX. Divitiacus embracing Cæsar, began to entreat with many tears, that he would not resolve upon anything severe against his brother: saying, "that he knew those things to be true; and that nobody felt more affliction on that account than himself: in regard that Dumnorix had grown great by his means, when he by his interest was very powerful both in his own country, and in the rest of Gaul, (and Dumnorix, by reason of his youth, very little.) And, although he used this power and strength not only to lessen his reputation, but in a manner to his destruction; yet he was moved both with fraternal affection, and the people's opinion. For if any thing severe should befal him from Cæsar, as he held such a place of friendship with him, there was nobody but would suppose that it had been done with his consent; by which means it would come to pass, that the affections of all Gaul would be alienated from him." As he was begging this of Cæsar in many words with tears, Cæsar takes him by the right hand; and comforting him, desires him to make an end of requesting; tells him his interest with him was so great, that at his desire and entreaty he would pardon both the injury done the commonwealth, and his own affront. He summons Dumnorix before him, brings in his brother; shews him what he blamed in him; lays before him what intelligence he had got, and what his countrymen complained of: advises him to avoid all suspicions for the time to come: tells him he pardoned what was past for the sake of his bro

ther Divitiacus. He sets spies over Dumnorix: that he might know what he did, and with whom he conversed.

XXI. The same day, being informed by his scouts that the enemy had encamped under a hill, eight miles from his camp, he sent out some to observe what the situation of the hill was, and what sort of ascent it had on all sides. Word was brought back that it was easy. About the third watch, he ordered his lieutenant as prætor T. Labienus, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions, and those as guides who had spied out the road, and tells him what his design was. He himself about the fourth watch taking the same road, by which the enemy had gone, marches on toward them; and sends all the cavalry before him. P. Considius, who was reputed very well skilled in military affairs, and who had been in the army of L. Sulla, and afterwards in that of M. Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts.

XXII. About the dawning of the day, when now the top of the hill was taken possession of by T. Labienus, and Cæsar himself was distant from the enemy's camp not above a mile and a half; and neither his approach, nor that of Labienus, was perceived by the enemy, as he learned afterwards from the prisoners; Considius, at full gallop, comes riding up to him; tells him the hill which he had ordered to be seized by Labienus, was taken possession of by the enemy: this he had discovered from the Gallic arms and ensigns: Cæsar draws off his forces to the next hill; and forms them in

battle order. Labienus, as he was ordered by Cæsar, not to enter upon battle, unless his forces were observed near the enemy's camp, that an attack might be made upon the enemy from all sides at the same time, after taking possession of the hill, waited for our men, and refrained from fighting. At length when the day was far advanced, Cæsar had intelligence by his scouts, both that the hill was seized upon by his men, and that the Helvetii had decamped, and that Considius, dismayed with fear, had reported to him as seen what he had not seen. This day Cæsar follows the enemy at the distance at which he was wont to follow, and at night pitches his camp three miles from their camp.

XXIII. The next day, as there remained only two days to the time when he would be obliged to deliver out corn to the army; and as he was not above eighteen miles from Bibracte, which is by far the greatest and most opulent city of the Ædui, he thought proper to look out for provisions: he directs his march away from the Helvetii, and proceeds to go to Bibracte. This is notified to the enemy by some deserters from L. Æmilius, a Captain of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, whether because they imagined that the Romans, being terrified, marched off from them, and this the rather, as they had not ventured an engagement the day before, when possessed of the higher ground; or because they hoped we might be cut off from provisions, changing their resolution, and altering their march, began to pursue and attack our men in the rear.

XXIV. Cæsar, after he perceives this, draws

off his forces to the next hill; and sent the cavalry to make head against the assaults of the enemy. In the mean time he formed three lines, consisting of four veteran legions, on the middle of the hill; in such manner, that, above himself, upon the summit of the hill, he might post the two legions, which he had lately raised in Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and ordered the whole hill to be covered with his men, and the baggage in the mean time to be brought together into one place, and it to be guarded by those who had their station in the upper line. The Helvetii coming up with all their waggons, gathered their baggage into one place, and after having repulsed, in a very close body, our cavalry, they formed themselves into a phalanx, and advanced towards our first line.

XXV. Cæsar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, and then the horses of all the rest, that, upon making the danger of all equal, he might cut off all hopes of escape, after encouraging his men, joined battle. The Roman soldiers casting their darts from the rising ground, easily broke the phalanx of the enemy. This being broken, they made a brisk attack upon them sword in hand. It was a great incumbrance to the Gauls in fighting, that when many of their targets were pierced through and pinned together by a single shower of the darts, as the iron had bowed, they could neither pull them out, nor fight conveniently enough, whilst their left hand was entangled: insomuch that many, after tossing their arm a long time, chose rather to drop the target out of their hand and fight with their body unco-

vered. At length, worn out with wounds, they began to retreat, and, as there was a hill about a mile off, to betake themselves to it. The hill being taken and our men following them, the Boji and Tulingi, who, being about fifteen thousand men, lagged behind the enemy's army, and were a guard to their rear, attacking our men in the open flank upon the march, surrounded them, and the Helvetii, who had retreated to the hill, observing this, began again to make assaults and renew the fight. The Romans in two divisions advance their ensigns, that were now turned about, to the end that the first and second line might make head against those that had been baffled, and beat off the field; and that the third might encounter those that came upon them.

XXVI. Whereupon they fought in dubious battle, a long time, and with great bravery. But when they could not any longer bear the furious charge of our soldiers, one part of them retreated, as they had done at first, to the hill; another betook themselves to the baggage and their waggons. For during the whole battle, though they fought from the seventh hour till the evening, no man could see his enemy turn his back. The fight was maintained also at the carriages during a great part of the night: for as they had set up their waggons by way of rampart, they both cast their darts from the rising ground upon our men as they came up, and some of them pushed pikes and lances through between the cars and wheels, and wounded our men. *After they had fought* a long time, our men *became masters of* their baggage and their camp.

There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix, were taken prisoners. After this battle there remained of the enemy about one hundred and thirty thousand men; and they marched incessantly the whole night, and arrived the fourth day upon the confines of the Lingones, having discontinued their march no part of the night; whereas our men, tarrying three days, both because of the soldiers' wounds, and for the burial of the slain, could not pursue them. Cæsar sent a letter and messengers to the Lingones, with orders, "that they should not supply them with corn, or any thing else: and, if they did supply them, he would treat them and the Helvetii alike." After an interval of three days, he began to follow them with all his forces.

XXVII. The Helvetii, pressed by the want of every thing, sent ambassadors to him to treat about a surrender, and, after they had met him upon the road, and had prostrated themselves at his feet, and, addressing him in an humble manner, had with tears desired peace, and he had ordered them to wait his arrival in the place where they then were, they obeyed. After Cæsar came up, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst these are seeking out, and getting together, a night intervening, about six thousand men belonging to the canton which is called Urbigenus, whether discouraged with fear, lest, after giving up their arms they should be put to death, or buoyed up with hopes of escaping, because they imagined in such a multitude of people surrendering themselves, their flight might either be concealed, or not be known at all, going out

the camp of the Helvetii in the beginning of the night, made the best of their way toward the Rhine and the confines of the Germans.

XXVIII. Which when Cæsar came to know, he ordered those through whose country they had travelled, to search them out, and bring them back, if they inclined to be acquitted by him; and when brought back, he ranked them among the number of his enemies; all the rest, upon their delivering the hostages, their arms, and the deserters, he admitted to a surrender. He commanded the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, to return into their own country, from whence they had come; and, as there was nothing at home, whereby they might keep themselves from starving, all the fruits of the ground being destroyed, he ordered the Allobroges to furnish them with corn; and commanded themselves to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt. This he did chiefly for this reason, because he did not incline that the country, out of which the Helvetii had gone, should be empty, lest the Germans, who dwelt beyond the Rhine, on account of the richness of the soil, should come over from their own country, to the country of the Helvetii; and be next neighbours to the Roman province in Gaul, and to the Allobroges. Upon a request made by the Ædui for leave to settle the Boji in their country, because they were a people well known for extraordinary valour, he granted the petition; to whom they assigned lands; and whom afterwards they admitted into the same state, as to law and liberty, with themselves.

XXIX. In the camp of the Helvetii, tablets written in Greek were found, and brought to Cæsar; in which tablets was made out in particular a catalogue, shewing what number of them had come from home, what ones were able to bear arms; and likewise separately the boys, the old men, and the women. Of all which lists the sum was, of the Helvetii 263,000; of the Tulingi 36,000; of the Latobrigi 14,000; of the Rauraci 23,000; and of the Boji 32,000. Among these there were about 92,000 that were able to carry arms. The total amount of all was about 368,000. Upon a review made, as Cæsar had ordered, of those who returned home, there was found the number of 110,000.

XXX. The war with the Helvetii being ended, deputies from almost all parts of Gaul, being the grandees of the states, waited upon Cæsar to congratulate him upon his success. Saying, "that they were sensible, that though, on account of former injuries committed by the Helvetii against the Roman people, he had taken vengeance upon them by the war, yet this had fallen out no less for the interest of the country of Gaul, than of the Roman people: in regard that the Helvetii had left their own homes, when in very flourishing circumstances, with a design to make war upon all Gaul, and seize upon the government thereof, and, out of a great variety, to choose for their habitation the place which they should judge the most convenient and most fruitful in all Gaul, and to make the other states their tributaries." They desired that they might be allowed to summon, against a certain day, ar

assembly of all the states of Gaul, and to do this by Cæsar's permission; "for they had some things, which they inclined to request of him by the general agreement of the states." This desire being granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and obliged themselves by an oath, that no one but those to whom the business was committed by common consent, should disclose the design of their meeting.

XXXI. This assembly being broken up, the same grandees of the states, who formerly had been with Cæsar, returned to him, and desired that they might be allowed to treat secretly with him in private, upon an affair concerning his own safety, and that of all the others. This request being obtained, they prostrated themselves all in tears at Cæsar's feet; saying, "that they were no less urgent and pressing, that what they said might not be disclosed, than they were to obtain the things which they were to request: because, if it should be divulged, they foresaw that they would be reduced to the last degree of misery." Divitiacus the Æduan spoke for them: and represented, "that there were two factions in all Gaul: that the Ædui headed one of them, and the Arverni the other. When they had contended with great keenness, for many years betwixt themselves, for the superiority, the consequence was, that the Germans were called in for hire by the Arverni and the Sequani. At first about fifteen thousand of them had crossed the Rhine: but after these savage and barbarous people fell in love with the country of the Gauls, and their way of living, and their wealth, more

of them had been drawn over: that now there was to the number of 120,000 of them in Gaul: with these the Ædui and their dependants had disputed by force of arms once and again, but being worsted had received a great discomfiture, had lost all their nobility, their whole senate, and all their cavalry. And that by these wars and misfortunes, they being brought low, who, both by their own interest, and by the friendship and favour of the Roman people, had borne a very great sway formerly in Gaul, were now forced to deliver up the persons of best quality in their country, as hostages to the Sequani, and obliged the state by an oath, that they should neither re-demand the hostages, nor pray assistance from the Roman people, nor refuse to continue for ever under their authority and government. That he himself was the only man of the whole country of the Ædui who could not be persuaded either to take the oath, or deliver his children for hostages. For this reason he fled from his country, and had come to Rome to the Senate, to desire their assistance, as being the only person tied up neither by oath nor hostages. But a worse fate had befallen the victorious Sequani, than the vanquished Ædui: because that Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had settled in their country, and seized upon a third part of the land belonging to the Sequani, which was the best of all Gaul, and was now ordering the Sequani to remove out of another third part: because, a few months ago 24,000 of the people called Harudes, had come over to him, for whom lands and possessions were to be provided. It would come to

pass within a few years that all the natives would be banished out of the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine: for the Gallic soil was not to be compared with the soil of the Germans, nor the way of living of the latter to be matched with that of the former. And that Ariovistus, when once he had defeated the forces of the Gauls in the battle which was fought at Magetobria, domineered in an insolent and cruel manner, demanded the children of every nobleman as hostages, and upon them shewed all the instances of barbarity and torture, if any thing was not done according to his will or pleasure. That he was a man savage, passionate, and rash: that his yoke could not any longer be endured; unless there was some aid to be found in Cæsar and the Roman people, all the Gauls must do the same thing that the Helvetii had done, that is, leave their country, and seek out another habitation, and other possessions at a distance from the Germans; and try their fortune whatever should happen. If these things he had said should be told to Ariovistus, he made no doubt but he would take the most severe revenge on all the hostages that were with him. That Cæsar, either by his own reputation and that of his army, or by the fame of his late victory, or the name of the Roman people, might deter him from bringing any more of the Germans over the Rhine, and might protect all Gaul from the tyranny of Ariovistus."

XXXII. This speech being delivered by Divi*tiacus, all, who were* present, began to beg assist*ance of Cæsar with* many tears. Cæsar observed

ıat of all present, the Sequani alone did none of ıose things which the rest did; but full of sor- ›w, with drooping heads, looked toward the round. And wondering what the reason of this ight be, he inquired at themselves. The Se- uani made no reply, but continued silent in the ıme disconsolate condition. After he had ıquired at them several times, and could not ttort any answer at all, the same Divitiacus the Eduan replied, "That in this respect the case of ıe Sequani was more wretched and dismal than ıat of the rest: because they dare not so much ı complain when alone in private, nor implore ssistance; and dreaded the cruelty of Ariovistus hen absent, as if he were present before them; ›r that others had the liberty at least to fly for : but every kind of cruel usage must be ıdured by the Sequani, who had received Ario- istus into their country, and whose cities were ll in his power."

XXXIII. After hearing these grievances, Cæsar ith words of comfort cheered the spirits of the Gauls: and promised, "that this affair should be ıken care of by him: that he had great hopes ıat Ariovistus, moved both by his acts of kind- ess and authority, would put an end to such ppression. After making this speech, he dis- ıissed the council. And in consequence of these ›mplaints, many other things inclined him to ıink, that this affair ought to be considered and ndertaken by him; first, because he saw that ıe Ædui, who had been often honoured with the *tles of brethren* and cousins by the senate, were *pt in slavery* and under subjection to the

Germans: and he understood that their hostages were in the custody of Ariovistus and the Sequani: which, considering the great power of the Roman people, he thought a scandal both upon himself and the commonwealth. And for the Germans to get a custom of crossing the Rhine by degrees, and great numbers of them coming into Gaul, he perceived was dangerous to the Roman state: nor could he imagine these fierce and barbarous people would restrain themselves to bounds, but, after they had seized upon all Gaul, would break in upon the province, and after that march for Italy, as the Cimbri and Teutoni had done before; especially since nothing but the Rhone divided the Sequani from our province: which events he thought he should prevent with all possible speed. And Ariovistus himself had assumed so much pride, and so much arrogance, that he appeared to be insufferable.

XXXIV. Wherefore he thought proper to send ambassadors to Ariovistus, to desire of him, "that he would appoint some place of a middle situation between them for a conference: that he wanted to treat with him about a public affair, and things of the highest importance to them both." To this embassy Ariovistus replied: "If he had had occasion for any thing from Cæsar, he would have waited upon him; and, if Cæsar wanted any thing from him, he must come to him. And further, that he dare neither come into those parts of Gaul, which Cæsar had possession of, without an army, nor could he bring together an army into one place without great expence and trouble; but it appeared strange to

him, what business either Cæsar or even the Roman people could have in his part of Gaul, which he had subdued by war."

XXXV. This answer being brought to Cæsar, Cæsar again dispatches ambassadors to him with the following instructions: "Since after being treated with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people, (for in his consulship he had been honoured with the title of king and ally by the senate,) he made this return to him and the Roman people, that he grudged coming to an interview when desired, and did not think himself obliged to advise and concert a matter of common concern: the things, which he was to require of him, were these: first, that he should not bring any more people over the Rhine into Gaul; and next, that he should restore the hostages, which he had from the Ædui; and grant to the Sequani, that they might be allowed to restore to them, by his permission, those which they had; that he should not molest the Ædui by oppression; nor make war upon them or their allies. If accordingly he should do this, he and the Roman people would be in constant amity and friendship with him. If this he did not obtain, (since the senate, in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, had decreed, that whoever had Gaul for their province, should protect the Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people, as far as he could do it in consistency with the interest of the commonwealth,) he would not overlook the injuries done the Ædui."

XXXVI. To this Ariovistus replied: "It was *the law of arms,* that they who conquered, might

govern those whom they had conquered, in what manner they pleased: and that the Roman people used to govern those they had vanquished, not by the direction of others, but according to their own pleasure. If he had not given directions to the Roman people, how they should use their right, he ought not to be disturbed by the Roman people in his right. That the Ædui, because they had tried the fortune of war, and had coped with him at arms, and had been conquered, were become tributaries to him. That Cæsar was doing great injustice, who by his coming into Gaul, would injure his revenue. That he would not restore to the Ædui their hostages: he would make war neither upon them nor their allies unjustly, that is, if they continued in the performance of that, which had been agreed upon, and paid their tribute yearly; if they did not do this, their being called brethren, or the Roman people, should be of little service to them. As to Cæsar's having signified to him, that he would not overlook the injuries done to the Ædui; he let him know, that none had ever contended with him but to their own destruction. He might engage, when he pleased: he should find, what the invincible Germans, that were well exercised in arms, and who had not come under a roof these fourteen years, could do in point of valour."

XXXVII. At one and the same time this answer was brought to Cæsar; and deputies arrived from the Ædui and from the Treviri. *The Ædui* came to complain, that the Harudes, *who had lately been* transported into Gaul, were *laying waste their* country; and that they could

not purchase peace from Ariovistus even by giving hostages. And the Treviri came to inform him that one hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped upon the banks of the Rhine, and were endeavouring to cross the Rhine; and that two brothers, Nasua and Cimberius, commanded them. At which news Cæsar being greatly alarmed, thought proper to make all dispatch, lest, if this new body of the Suevi joined themselves with the old forces of Ariovistus, they should less easily be withstood. Wherefore having provided corn with all the haste he could, he hastened by great marches towards Ariovistus.

XXXVIII. When he had marched three days, word was brought him, that Ariovistus was gone with all his forces to take possession of Vesontio, which is the greatest city belonging to the Sequani, and that he was advanced three days journey from his own territories. Cæsar thought it highly concerned him to use all precaution, that this might not happen. For in this city there was great store of all things that were necessary for war, and it was so fortified by the situation of the place, that it afforded great convenience for protracting the war; because the river Dubis, as if led about with a pair of compasses, surrounds almost the whole city: a mountain of a considerable height fences the remaining space, which is not above six hundred feet, where the river ceases, and that in such a manner that the banks of the river reach the roots of the mountain on both sides. A wall drawn round this mountain forms a citadel, and unites it with the town. Hither Cæsar hastens by

great marches night and day: and taking possession of the city, places a garrison in it.

XXXIX. Whilst he stays a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and provisions, upon our men inquiring about the enemy, and by the reports of the Gauls, and merchants, who said the Germans were of a huge stature of body, of prodigious courage, and experience in war, that often they, upon engaging with them, had not been able to bear even their looks, and the fierceness of their eyes: such a panic on a sudden seized the whole army, that it not a little discomposed the mind and spirits of all. This first took rise among some military tribunes, officers, and others, who, having attended Cæsar, out of compliment, from the city Rome, now deplored the great danger they thought themselves in, because they had no great experience in military affairs. Of whom some, alleging different reasons, which they pretended were pressing upon them to be gone, petitioned that they might be allowed to depart by his permission: some, moved by shame, to avoid the imputation of cowardice, staid still. These however could neither put on cheerful looks, nor sometimes restrain tears: but either shut up in their tents bewailed their destiny, or with their comrades lamented the common danger. Generally throughout the whole camp, wills were signed. And through the whisperings and cowardice of these, by degrees even they, who had great experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and they who commanded the cavalry, were put into great confusion. And those amongst

them, who inclined to be thought less daunted, pretended they were not afraid of the enemy, but of the narrow passes of the way, and the vast woods that lay betwixt them and Ariovistus, or doubted, as to provision, whether it could conveniently enough be conveyed to them. And some insinuated to Cæsar, that upon his giving order to decamp, and advance the ensigns, the soldiers would not obey orders, nor, by reason of their fear, advance the standards.

XL. After he observed this, calling a council of war, and admitting to this council the centurions of every rank, he severely reprimanded them: "First, because they had presumed to inquire or conjecture, whither, or upon what design, they were led out. He told them that Ariovistus, during his consulship, had most earnestly courted the friendship of the Roman people. And why should any one imagine he would go off from his duty in such a rash manner? For his part he was persuaded, were his demands understood by Ariovistus, and the equity of the proposals considered, he would slight neither his friendship nor that of the Roman people. And if hurried on by fury and madness he should make war, what had they to be afraid of? Why should they despair either of their own bravery, or of his activity? That trial had been made of this enemy in the memory of our fathers, when, upon the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutoni by C. Marius, the army appeared to have deserved no less praise than the general himself. Trial had been made also lately in Italy, during the insurrections of the slaves; whom by the bye the prac-

tice and discipline, which they had learned from us, had somewhat improved: from whence might be gathered, what a mighty advantage perseverance carried in it: because that, whom unarmed they had been in dread of for some time without reason, these they afterwards had conquered when armed, and flushed with success: in fine, that these were the same, with whom the Helvetii had often engaged, and whom they had frequently vanquished, not only in their own country, but also in theirs, who yet could not be a match for our army. If the unfortunate battle and defeat of the Gauls startled any of them, these, if they inquired, would find that Ariovistus, after the Gauls were wearied with the long continuance of the war, when for several months he had kept himself within the camp and the fens, and had given no opportunity of battle, suddenly attacking them, by this time despairing of an engagement, and depressed, had conquered more by policy and stratagem, than by courage. For which method there might be room in a war against a barbarous and unskilful people; but even Ariovistus himself did not expect our army could be trepanned in this way. Those who ascribed their fear to the pretence about provisions, and the narrow passes of the road, behaved insolently: as they seemed either to despair of their general's acting his part, or to offer him directions. These things should be his care; the *Sequani*, the Leuci, and the Lingones, were to *furnish corn: and* by this time the corn upon the *fields was ripe:* as to the road, themselves should *be judges in a* short time. As to the report that

the soldiers would not obey his orders, nor advance the standards, he was no way disturbed with that matter, for he well knew to whomsoever an army had refused obedience, the reason had been, that either, upon his mismanaging affairs, fortune had failed him; or upon the discovery of some crime, his avarice had been made evident; as to himself, his integrity had been demonstrated in the whole tenor of his life, and his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. Wherefore he would immediately execute, what he once designed to have put off to a more distant day, and would decamp next night, about the fourth watch, that he might as soon as possible understand, whether shame and regard to duty, or cowardice, had the ascendant among them. And though none else should attend him, yet he would march with the tenth legion only, of which he had no distrust, and it should be his life-guard." Cæsar had both chiefly favoured this legion, and because of their bravery, put the greatest trust in them.

XLI. After the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were in a strange manner altered, and the greatest cheerfulness and fondness for going on with the war was produced: and first the tenth legion returned him thanks by their tribunes, because he had expressed a very good opinion of them; and assured him that they were most ready to prosecute the war. Then the rest of the legions endeavoured to apologize to Cæsar by their tribunes, and the Centurions of the first rank: protesting, they had never hesitated, nor been under any terror, nor had ima-

gined that the forming a judgment with respect to the management of the war was their part, but belonged to their general. Their apology being admitted, and the road surveyed by Divitiacus, because of all others he put the greatest confidence in him, and report being made, that by fetching a compass of somewhat more than fifty miles he might lead his army through an open country, he marched out, as he had said, about the fourth watch. Upon the seventh day, not having stopped in his march, he was informed by his scouts, that Ariovistus' army was distant from ours only twenty-four miles.

XLII. Upon getting notice of Cæsar's approach, Ariovistus dispatches ambassadors to him: to acquaint him, that what formerly he had been requiring with respect to a conference, might for his part be done, since he was come nearer: and he thought he might now do it without danger. Cæsar did not reject the offer: and imagined he was now come to a right temper; since of his own accord he offered that which formerly he had refused upon request; and was in great hopes, considering his own great favours and those of the Roman people toward him, that it would come to pass, that, after pondering his demands, he would desist from his obstinacy. The fifth day after this was appointed as the day for the interview. In the mean time, as messengers passed frequently to and fro betwixt them, Ariovistus desired that Cæsar would not bring any infantry to the conference; for he was afraid lest he should be surrounded treacherously by them: that both of them should come escorted

with a few cavalry; and that he would not come upon other terms. Cæsar, because he neither wished the conference to be set aside for the alleged reason, nor did he dare to trust the safety of his person to the cavalry of the Gauls, thought the most convenient way was, to turn the Gallic riders off all the horses, and to mount them with the soldiers of the tenth legion, in whom he placed the greatest confidence; that he might have the most friendly guard if there should be any occasion for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth legion said not unwittingly, "That Cæsar did more for them than he had promised: he had promised to use the tenth legion in place of a prætorian cohort: but now he remodelled them into cavalry."

XLIII. There was a spacious plain, and in it a pretty large mound of earth. This place was nearly at an equal distance from either camp. Thither, as had been agreed, they repaired to the conference. Cæsar posted the legion which he had brought up, mounted on horses, two hundred paces from this mound: the cavalry of Ariovistus also stopped at an equal distance. Ariovistus proposed that they should discourse on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they should bring each ten persons to the conference. When they were come to the place, Cæsar in the beginning of his speech recounted his own and the senate's acts of kindness towards him: "That by the senate he had been honoured with the title of *king, and friend*, and that very honourable presents had been sent him: which usage, he told

him, happened but to few, and used to be bestowed for men's signal deserts; that he had obtained these honours, through his and the senate's favour and bounty, when he had neither access nor just grounds to require them. He shewed him also what ancient and what just grounds of alliance were betwixt them and the Ædui: what, how many, and how honourable decrees of the senate had been made in their favour: how at all times the Ædui had had the chief sway in all Gaul, even before they had courted our friendship. That it was the manner of the Roman people to be desirous that their allies and friends should not only lose nothing of what they had, but should increase in interest, reputation, and honour. But who could endure, that that should be forced from them, which, till their alliance with the Roman people, they had possessed? After this he demanded the same things, which he had given in charge to his ambassadors, that he should not make war either upon the Ædui or their allies; that he should restore their hostages; if he could send back no part of the Germans to their own home, at least he should not suffer any more to cross the Rhine."

XLIV. Ariovistus made little answer to Cæsar's demands; but enlarged much on his own virtues; saying, "he had crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but being asked and called by the Gauls: that he had left his home and relations not without high expectations, and great rewards offered him; that he had his possession in Gaul granted him by the Gauls themselves; that the

hostages had been delivered by their own desire; that by the right of war he levied a tribute, which conquerors had been accustomed to impose upon the vanquished; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him: that all the states of Gaul had come to attack him, and had formed a camp in opposition to him: that all these forces had been routed and overthrown by him in one battle. If they had a mind to make another trial, he was ready to engage them a second time; if they inclined to enjoy peace, it was wrong to refuse payment of the tribute, which till this time they had paid cheerfully. That the friendship of the Roman people ought to be his honour and security, not his disadvantage: and that he had courted it in this view. If by means of the Roman people his tribute should be discontinued, and those who had submitted to him be withdrawn from their allegiance, he would no less heartily renounce the friendship of the Roman people, than he had sought it. As to his transporting a number of Germans into Gaul, he did this with a design to secure himself, and not to invade Gaul; an evidence of this was, that he had not come but upon invitation, and that he had not raised a war, but warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people: that the army of the Roman people had never before this time gone beyond the bounds of their Gallic province. What could they mean? Why did they encroach upon his possessions? This part of Gaul was his province, as the other ours. As liberty ought not to be allowed him, if he would make an attack upon our territories, so

likewise were unjust, who could disturb him in the possession of his right. As to his alleging that the Ædui had been dignified with the title of brethren by the senate; he was not so wild, nor so unacquainted with the world, as not to know, that the Ædui had neither carried aid to the Romans, in their last war with the Allobroges, nor had they made use of the assistance of the Roman people in those broils, which the Ædui had among themselves and with the Sequani. He had ground to suspect, that Cæsar, after pretending friendship, as he had an army in Gaul, kept it there on purpose to ruin him. And unless he departed, and withdrew his army from these quarters, he would not take him for a friend, but for an enemy: and if he should murder him, he would do an acceptable piece of service to many of the nobility and great men among the Roman people: this he had an assurance of from themselves by their messengers; all whose favour and friendship he could purchase by his death. But if he would depart, and give up the free possession of Gaul to him, he would gratify him with a considerable reward, and whatever wars he inclined should be carried on, he would finish them without any trouble and danger to him."

XLV. Many things were advanced by Cæsar on this head, shewing "why he could not desist from his resolution, and that neither his own custom nor that of the Roman people, did permit him to abandon well deserving allies: nor could he think that Gaul belonged rather to Ariovistus, than to the Roman people. That the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by Q.

Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them, and had not reduced them into a province, nor laid them under tribute. And if the most ancient times must be looked into, the authority of the Roman people in Gaul was very just: if the judgment of the senate must be regarded, Gaul ought to be free, which when subdued in war, they designed should have the use of its own laws."

XLVI. Whilst these things were transacting in the conference, it was told Cæsar, that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching nearer to the mound, and were riding up toward our soldiers; and were throwing stones and darts among them. Cæsar made an end of speaking; and betook himself to his party; and commanded his men, not to return any weapon at all upon the enemy. For though he perceived a battle might be fought, with the cavalry of Ariovistus, without any danger to his select legion, yet he was of opinion he ought to give no occasion of its being said, after the enemy was beaten, that they had been drawn into a snare by him at the conference during a reliance on their faith. After the report was spread among the common soldiers, with what insolence Ariovistus had behaved at the interview, and had commanded the Romans to be gone out of Gaul, and that his cavalry had made an attack upon our men, and how this put an end to the conference; a far greater briskness, and a greater eagerness to fight, was infused into the army.

XLVII. Two days after, Ariovistus dispatches

ambassadors to Cæsar, to acquaint him, that he was desirous to treat with him concerning those affairs, which had been begun to be treated of betwixt them, and had not been finished: and to request that he would either appoint a day for an interview a second time; or, if he did not approve of this, that he would send some of his ambassadors to him. To Cæsar there did not appear any occasion for a conference, and the rather, because the day before this the Germans could not be restrained from throwing darts among our men. And he imagined, he would with great danger send one of his Romans as an ambassador to him, and would expose him to the cruelty of savage men. Wherefore it appeared most proper, to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest virtue and humanity, (whose father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his integrity, and his skill in the Gallic language, which now Ariovistus, after long custom, much used, and also because the Germans had no reason to act treacherously to him; and with him he sent M. Mettius, who had experieneed the hospitality of Ariovistus. These he ordered to hear what Ariovistus would say, and report to him. Whom when Ariovistus observed by him in his camp, he cried out, in the presence of his army: Why had they come to him? Was it with a design to be spies? And as they were endeavouring to speak, he stopped them, and threw them into irons.

XLVIII. The same day he decamped, and sat down under a hill six miles from Cæsar's camp. The day after this, he led away his army past Cæsar's camp, and pitched his camp two miles beyond him: with a design to cut off Cæsar from the corn and provisions, which should be sent from the Sequani and Ædui. From this day Cæsar for five days successively drew out his forces before the camp, and formed them into battle order; to the end that, if Ariovistus wished to contend in battle, he might not want an opportunity. Ariovistus during all these days kept his army within the camp: but engaged daily in horse-skirmishes. The manner of fighting in which the Germans had exercised themselves, was this: They had six thousand horse, and the same number of very nimble, and very hardy foot; whom they had picked out of all the army, each horseman one, as his guard. With these they intermingled in engagements: to these the horse betook themselves when worsted: these, in case of any hardship, flocked together to assist: if any, upon receiving a grievous wound, had dropped from his horse, they stood round him: if there was occasion to advance far, or to make a quick retreat, such was their nimbleness, through frequent practice, that supported by the horses' manes, they would keep pace with them.

XLIX. When Cæsar found he kept himself within his camp, that he might not any longer be cut off from provisions, he chose a place proper for a camp, beyond the spot on whic the Germans had encamped, and about six h

dred paces from them; and having drawn up his army in three lines, he came to the place. He ordered the first and second line to be in arms, and the third to fortify the camp. This place, as already said, was distant from the enemy about six hundred paces. Thither Ariovistus dispatched about sixteen thousand of his light armed men, with all his cavalry; which forces were designed to strike terror into our men, and hinder them from the work. Cæsar, nevertheless, as he had appointed formerly, ordered two lines to oppose the enemy; and the third to execute the work. Having fortified the camp, he left two legions there, and part of the auxiliaries: the other four legions he led back into the larger camp.

L. Next day Cæsar, according to his custom, drew his forces out of both camps: and having advanced a little from the larger camp, disposed them in order of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When he found that even yet they did not stir out of their trenches, about noon he led back his army to their camps. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. They fought fiercely on both sides, till the evening. At sun-set Ariovistus, after many wounds both given and received, led back his forces to their camp. Cæsar, upon inquiring of the prisoners, why Ariovistus would not fight in a pitched battle, found this to be the reason: Because among the Germans it was a custom, that their elderly women determined by oracles and divination, whether the battle could be fought to advantage or not: and

that they had declared, It was not destined for the Germans to conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new Moon.

LI. The day after this, Cæsar left what appeared sufficient for a guard to both camps: and ranged all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy before the lesser camp, in order to make a showy appearance with the auxiliaries, because he had no great store of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy. And having drawn up his army in three lines, he advanced up to the enemy's camp. Then at last the Germans, of necessity, drew their forces out of the camp, and ranged by their tribes, and at equal distances, the Harudes, the Marcomani, the Tribocci, the Vangiones, the Nemetes, the Sedusii, and the Suevi: and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and waggons; that no hope (of security) by flight might be left. On these they placed the women, who, weeping, and with their hair dishevelled, entreated the men, as they went on to battle, not to deliver them up for slaves to the Romans.

LII. Cæsar assigned to each legion a lieutenant, and a questor: that every one might have these as witnesses of his bravery. He himself began the battle on the right wing, because he perceived that part of the enemy to be least firm. Accordingly our men, upon a signal given, made an attack upon the enemy with great vigour: whereupon the enemy rushed forward all on a sudden, and with great nimbleness; so that there was not time for throwing the darts at the enemy. Wherefore, throwing aside th

darts, they engaged in close fight with the swords. But the Germans, according to their custom, having quickly formed a phalanx, sustained the charge of the swords. There were found several of our soldiers that jumped up upon the phalanx, and pulled away the targets with their hands, and wounded them from above. When the enemy's army was routed in their left wing, and put to flight, in their right wing they greatly overpowered our army by their numbers. But after P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the horse, observed this, (which he was the readier to notice, because he was more at liberty to look about him, than those who were employed in the action,) he dispatched the third line to relieve our men in distress.

LIII. Whereupon the battle was renewed, and all the enemies turned their back, nor did they give over flying, till they had arrived at the river Rhine, about fifty miles from the place where the battle was fought. There a very few, either trusting to their strength, endeavoured to swim over; or, finding boats, made a shift to escape. Among these was Ariovistus, who finding a wherry tied to the bank, made his escape in it: our horse coming up slaughtered all the rest. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom he had brought along with him from his own country; the other a Norican, the sister of King Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent thither by her brother. Both perished in the flight. They had two daughters, whereof one was killed, and the other taken prisoner. C. Valerius Procillus, whilst he

was dragged by his keepers in the flight, being bound with three chains, fell in the way of Cæsar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy with his cavalry. Which event truly gave Cæsar no less pleasure, than the victory itself: because he saw the most honourable person of the Roman province in Gaul, his own intimate acquaintance, and friend, rescued from the hands of enemies, and restored to him: and that fortune had not detracted any thing from the great joy and rejoicing, by his misfortune. He told, that, in his own presence, a consultation had been held three times concerning him by lots, whether he should be put to death immediately by burning, or kept till another time: and that by the favour of the lots he had been saved. M. Mettius also was found, and brought back to him.

LIV. The news of this battle being spread beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to the banks of the Rhine, began to return home: whom the Ubii, who live next to the Rhine, pursued whilst under great consternation, and slaughtered a vast number of them. Cæsar, having ended two very considerable wars in one campaign, led his army into winter quarters amongst the Sequani, somewhat sooner than the season of the year required: he gave the command of the winter quarters to Labienus: he himself set out for Hither Gaul to hold assizes.

BOOK II.

I. WHILST Cæsar was in Hither Gaul in winter quarters, as we have shown above, it was currently reported to him, and he was also acquainted more surely by letters from Labienus, "that all the Belgæ, who we said were a third part of Gaul, were conspiring against the Roman people; and giving hostages to one another. The reasons of the combination were these: first, because they were afraid, lest our army, after all Gaul was subdued, should be brought upon them: and next, because they were solicited by some Gauls, part of whom, as they had not inclined that the Germans should be any longer in Gaul, so they took it amiss that the army of the Roman people should winter and become familiar in Gaul: and of whom another part, from a fickleness and inconsistency of temper, were fond of revolutions: they were solicited by some also of an aspiring temper, because in Gaul dominions were frequently seized by men of power, and such as have money to hire people; who could less easily effect such a project under our government."

II. Cæsar being alarmed with these reports and letters, raised two new legions in Hither Gaul, and about the beginning of summer sent his lieutenant Q. Pedius, to conduct them into the more inland parts of Gaul. He himself, as soon as there began to be plenty of grass for the horses, came to the army. He gives orders to the Senones, and other Gauls, that were next neighbours to the Belgæ, to procure intelligence

of what was doing among them: and acquaint him with the matter. These all invariably reported, "that forces were raising and an army gathering together into one place." Then indeed he was of opinion that he ought not to hesitate any longer, but set out upon his march toward them [within twelve days]. Wherefore having provided corn, he decamps, and about fifteen days after arrived upon the confines of the Belgæ.

III. As he arrived there unexpectedly, and sooner than any imagined, the Remi, who are a province of the Belgæ, next to Gaul, sent Iccius and Antebrogius, persons of the highest rank in their province, ambassadors to him: to acquaint him, "that they resigned themselves and all they had to the protection and disposal of the Roman people, and that they had not entered into the combination with the rest of the Belgæ; nor conspired at all against the Roman people; and that they were ready both to give hostages, and submit to orders, and receive him into their towns, and furnish him with corn, and other necessaries: that all the rest of the Belgæ were in arms; and that the Germans, who live on this side the Rhine, had joined with them (in the plot), and that such was the desperate keenness of all of them, that they could not so much as dissuade their own brethren and blood-relations, the Suessiones, who enjoyed the same privileges, the same laws, and had the same government, and the same magistracy with themselves, from engaging with them in this wild design."

IV. Upon Cæsar's inquiring of them, what states were in arms, and what they could do in

war, he found out, "that most of the Belgæ were descended from the Germans, and that upon crossing the Rhine in former times, they had settled in this place on account of the fertility of the country: and had driven out the Gauls, who inhabited these quarters: and that they were the only people, who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was over-run, had kept the Teutoni and Cimbri, from entering within their territories: whence it had come to pass, that upon the memory of these achievements, they had assumed to themselves a mighty air, and high spirit in military affairs. As to their number, the Remi told him, "they had certain accounts of every thing: for being connected with them by kindred and affinity, they had come to know, what number each of them had promised in the common council of the Belgæ to furnish for this war. That the Bellovaci were the most considerable among them both for courage, and reputation, and number of men: that they could fit out 100,000 armed men, and had actually promised 60,000 picked out of that number: and claimed to themselves the management of the whole war. That the Suessiones were their next neighbours; and possessed a very large and fertile country; Divitiacus even in our times was king among them, the most potent prince of all Gaul; who held the government both of a great part of this country, and also that of Britain: their king at present was Galba; upon him by the consent of all parties the management of the whole war was conferred, on account of his justice and prudence: they had twelve cities; and promised to

furnish 50,000 armed men: the Nervii had promised as many, who are esteemed the most barbarous people among them, and lie at a very great distance: the Atrebates had promised 15,000: the Ambiani 10,000: the Morini 25,000: the Menappi 9,000: the Caleti 10,000; the Velocasses and Veromandui as many: the Aduatuci 29,000: and that they imagined the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Cærasi, and the Pæmani, who by one name are called Germans, had reckoned at about 40,000."

V. Cæsar having encouraged the Remi, and complimented them handsomely in a speech, ordered their whole senate to wait upon him, and the children of their grandees to be brought to him as hostages: all which was punctually performed by them at the day appointed. He having addressed himself with great earnestness to Divitiacus the Æduan, shews him how much it would contribute to the public cause and their common safety, that the forces of the enemy should be kept divided, that they might not be obliged to engage with so great a number at one time. This might be brought about if the Ædui would lead their forces into the territories of the Bellovaci, and begin to ravage their country: with these instructions he dismisses him. After he perceived that all the forces of the Belgæ, now got together into one place, were approaching toward him, and had intelligence from the scouts which he had sent out, and from the Remi, that *by this time* they were not far off; he made all *haste to* carry his army over the river Axona, *which is* upon the remote confines of the Remi

and there pitched his camp. Which situation both secured one side of his camp by the banks of the river, and rendered the places that were behind him safe from the enemy, and made it possible for provisions to be brought in to him without danger by the Remi, and the other states. Upon this river was a bridge, and on it he places a guard; and leaves upon the other side of the river his lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus with six cohorts; and orders him to fortify a camp with a rampart to the height of twelve feet, and a trench of eighteen feet in breadth.

VI. A city of the Remi, by name Bibrax, was distant from the camp eight miles. This the Belgæ upon their march began to assault with great fury; and with much ado were they withstood by the inhabitants that day. The mode of attack of the Gauls and the Belgæ is the same: After drawing a great number of men round the whole fortifications, when stones begin to be thrown against the wall on all sides, and the wall is clear of the defenders; then forming a testudo, they approach to the gates, and undermine the wall. Which on this occasion was easily done, for whilst so great a number were throwing stones and darts, it was not possible for any man to stand upon the wall. When night had put an end to the assault, Iccius, one of the Remi, a person of the greatest quality and interest amongst his countrymen, and who at that time commanded the town, being one of those who had come ambassadors to Cæsar about negociating a peace, dispatches couriers to Cæsar, to acquaint him, "that unless assistance was

sent him, he would not be able to hold out any longer."

VII. Cæsar, making use of the same persons for guides, that had come as messengers from Iccius, dispatches thither about midnight some Numidian and Cretian archers, and some Balearian slingers, for the relief of the townsmen, upon whose arrival, both resolution to hold out, with hopes of making good their defence, was added to the Remi; and the enemy by the same means lost hopes of taking possession of the city. Wherefore, after staying a short while before the town, and ravaging the country of the Remi; and after setting fire to all the villages and houses which they could come at, they marched away with all their forces towards Cæsar's camp: and pitched their camp within less than two miles of him: which camp, as appeared by the smoke, and the fires, extended to upwards of eight miles in breadth.

VIII. Cæsar at first, both because of the great number of the enemy, and on account of their extraordinary reputation for bravery, resolved to decline battle: he made trial however every day by horse skirmishes what the enemy could do in point of courage, and what our men dare attempt. And finding our men were not inferior to them, and that the place before the camp was convenient and proper by its situation for drawing up the army in order of battle, because the little hill, where the camp was pitched, rising gently from the plain, extended as much in breadth on the fore part, as the space the army when put in order of battle could take up, and had a stee

fall along the side on either hand; and ascending in an easy manner toward the brow, turned by degrees to a plain: on both sides of this hill he drew a ditch in a cross direction to the hill, about four hundred paces in length; and toward the end of the ditches he erected bulwarks, and planted engines on them: lest, after he had drawn up his army, the enemy (as they were so powerful in respect of number) might surround in the flank his men, whilst they were fighting. This being done, leaving in the camp the two legions, which he had lately raised, that they might be brought out as reserve, if in any way there should be occasion, he drew up the other six legions before the camp in order of battle. The enemy likewise drawing their forces out of the camp, put them in proper order.

IX. There lay a small marsh betwixt our army and that of the enemy. The enemy waited to see if our men would pass this; and our men, in case a passage should have been first attempted by the enemy, stood ready in arms, to attack them whilst entangled. In the mean time the horse was engaged in a skirmish betwixt the two armies. But as neither party began to cross, upon the skirmish of the cavalry being now favourable to our men, Cæsar led back his men into the camp. The enemy immediately marched away from this place to the river Axona, which we said was behind our camp. And there finding fords, they endeavoured to transport part of their forces; with a design, if they could, to force the little camp, which the lieutenant Q. Titurius had the charge of, and cut down the bridge; and if

they could not do this, to ravage the country of the Remi, who were of great service to us for carrying on the war; and so cut off our men from provisions.

X. Cæsar being informed of this by Titurius, conveys along the bridge all his cavalry, and light-armed Numidians, as also his slingers, and archers, and marches toward them. There was a sharp conflict on this occasion. Our men attacking the enemy whilst entangled in the river, slew a great number of them; and with a multitude of darts repulsed the rest as they were endeavouring in a most resolute manner to come on the carcases of those that were killed; and cut to pieces those who had got over at first, and who were surrounded by the cavalry. The enemy, when they found their hopes had deceived them, both with respect to their taking the city Bribax, and as to their passing the river, and when they perceived our men would not come out to a place of disadvantage in order to fight them, and provisions began to fail them; a council of war being called, they agreed it was best for every man to return to his own country, and obliged themselves to meet from all parts for the defence of those, into whose territories the Romans should first lead their army; that so they might dispute the matter rather in their own, than in a foreign country; and have the use of the provisions of corn they had at home. Among other reasons, the following consideration likewise led them into this resolution; because they had got intelligence, that Divitiacus and the Ædui were approaching toward the confines of the Bellovaci.

And the Bellovaci could not be prevailed upon to stay any longer, and not carry aid to their own people.

XI. This resolution being fixed, they marched out of their camp about the second watch with great noise and confusion, under no distinct order or command; and as every one strove for the first step of the road, and was in great haste to get home, they caused their departure to appear like a running away. Cæsar having notice of this immediately by his spies, but fearing an ambuscade, because he had not yet discovered upon what account they were gone off, kept his army and the cavalry within the camp. But at break of day, upon a confirmation of the matter by his scouts, he dispatched all the cavalry to annoy their rear. And set over them two lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. And ordered his lieutenant T. Labienus to follow them with three legions. These attacking their rear, and pursuing them for several miles, slaughtered vast numbers of them as they fled: whilst these in the rear, with whom they came up, halted; and with great courage received the charge of our soldiers; those in the van, because they thought themselves at a distance from danger, and were not restrained by any necessity or command, upon hearing the noise, as the ranks were quite disordered, placed all their security in flight. Thus our men, without any danger to themselves, slaughtered prodigious numbers of them as long as day lasted; and at sun-set gave over the pursuit, and returned to the camp, as they had been ordered.

XII. Next day Cæsar, before the enemy could recover themselves from their consternation and flight, led his army into the country of the Suessiones, who were next neighbours to the Remi; and, after performing a great march, set out for the town called Noviodunum. But after endeavouring to surprise it as he passed alone, because he was informed it wanted a garrison, he was not able to take it, by reason of the breadth of the ditch, and the height of the wall, though few were to defend it. Wherefore having fortified his camp, he began to set up vineæ, and to provide what things were necessary for a siege. In the mean time all the army of the Suessiones, after their flight, came flocking to the town the night following. When the vineæ were quickly reared against the town, and when an embankment was thrown up and towers built, the Gauls, amazed both with the hugeness of the works, which they had neither seen before, nor heard of, and with the dispatch of the Romans, send deputies to Cæsar to treat about surrender, and, upon the intercession of the Remi, obtain their request.

XIII. Cæsar, the chief persons of their state being received as hostages, and among these, the two sons of Galba himself their king, and all the arms in the town being delivered up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and leads his army against the Bellovaci. And when they had collected themselves and all their effects into the town of Bratuspantium, and were informed that Cæsar with his army was but about five miles from the town, all their old men going out of the

city, began to stretch out their hands to Cæsar, and made signs with their voice that they would come under his faith and protection; and would not contend any longer against the Roman people by arms. In like manner, when he was come to the town, and was pitching his camp there, the boys and women from the wall, with hands spread out, according to the manner of their country, begged peace of the Romans.

XIV. For these Divitiacus (for after the departure of the Belgæ, dismissing the forces of the Ædui, he had returned to Cæsar) intercedes, representing, "that the Bellovaci at all times had been in alliance and friendship with the state of the Ædui: that they had both revolted from the Ædui, and made war upon the Roman people, being urged on by their nobility, who had told them that the Ædui were reduced into a state of slavery by Cæsar, and were suffering all manner of indignities and affronts. That those who were the ringleaders in this plot had fled into Britain, because they now found what a mighty calamity they had brought upon their country. That not only the Bellovaci, but also the Ædui in their behalf begged, that he would exercise his mercy and clemency toward them. Which if he did, he would raise the credit of the Ædui amongst all the Belgæ; with whose aid and wealth they had been accustomed to support themselves, when any wars happened."

XV. Cæsar replied, that out of regard to Divitiacus and for the sake of the Ædui, he would receive them into his protection, and save them: but, as their state was of great note amongst the

Belgæ, and exceeded in the number of people, he demanded 600 hostages. These being delivered, and all the arms of the town given up, he marched away from this place to the country of the Ambiani, who surrendered themselves, and all they had, without delay. Upon their country bordered the Nervii: concerning whose character and manners, Cæsar when he inquired found: "That merchants have no access to them: that they suffered no wine, nor other things, that contribute to luxury, to be imported: because they were of opinion, that by such things their spirits were enervated, and their courage impaired: that they were a savage people, and of great bravery: that they had often upbraided and blamed the rest of the Belgæ, who had submitted themselves to the Roman people, and renounced their native fortitude: and that they determined they would neither send ambassadors, nor accept of any terms of peace."

XVI. After he had made three days march in their country, he was informed by some prisoners, "that the river Sabis was not above ten miles distant from his camp; that all the Nervii had encamped on the other side of that river: and that there, together with their neighbours, the Atrebates and Veromandui, they waited the arrival of the Romans; for they had persuaded both these states to try the same fortune of war with themselves; that the forces likewise of the Aduatuci were expected by them, and were actually on their march: that they had put the women, and those who by reason of their age appeared unfit for fighting, into a place, to which an army could not approach on account of marshes."

XVII. Upon this intelligence, he sends forward his scouts and centurions to choose out a convenient place for a camp. And as a good many of the Belgæ that had submitted, and of the other Gauls, attended Cæsar, and marched along with him: some of these, as we learned afterwards from the prisoners, having observed the manner of our army's march during these days, went off in the night to the Nervii, and told them "that a great quantity of baggage was betwixt the several legions; and that it would be no difficulty, when the first legion was arrived in the camp, and the other legions were a great way off, to attack this first legion whilst encumbered with their carriages: upon the routing of which, and the seizing of their baggage, it would come to pass, that the rest would not have courage to make any further stand." To the advice of those who brought the information, is also added weight, viz. that the Nervii of old, as they had no cavalry, (nor even to this day do they make that their study, but all the forces they have consist of infantry,) in order to resist more effectually the cavalry of their neighbours, if at any time they should come upon them with a design to plunder, had made a fortification, by notching young trees, and bending down the boughs in a close manner toward the sides, and stuffing the vacancies with brambles and thorns, in such a way, that these hedges served as a fence instead of a wall: which was not only impassable, but could not so much as be seen through. When therefore the progress of our army should come to be interrupted by this fence, the Nervii were

of opinion, that the advice offered ought not to be neglected.

XVIII. The situation of the place, which our men had made choice of for a camp, was as follows:—A little hill descending evenly from the top, reached to the river Sabis, which we mentioned above. A little hill of a like ascent, over against and opposite to this, took its rise from the river, being open towards the lowest part for about 200 paces; but so woody in the upper quarter, that its inner parts could not be clearly discovered by the eye. The enemy kept themselves concealed within this wood: upon the open ground along the river, appeared a few troops of horse. The depth of the river was about three feet.

XIX. Cæsar sending his cavalry before, followed close after with all his forces: but the form and order of his march was quite otherwise than the Belgæ had reported to the Nervii: for Cæsar, as he was now approaching toward the enemy, conducted in the van, according to his custom, six legions clear of baggage; behind these he ranged the carriages of the whole army: then the two legions, that had been lately levied, shut up the rear, and were a guard to the carriages. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having crossed the river, engaged in battle with the cavalry of the enemy. Whilst they every now and then scampered off to the woods to their companions; and then again made a sally from the woods upon our men: nor dare our men pursue them, as they fled, further than as far as the plain and open ground reached. In t

mean time the six legions, who came first up, after measuring out the work among them, began to fortify the camp. As soon as the foremost carriages of our army were observed by those who lay concealed in the woods; which was the time agreed upon among them for giving battle, as they had formed their lines and ranks within the thickets, and animated one another, they rushed out on a sudden with all their forces, and made an attack on our cavalry. Having easily broken and dispersed them, they came running down to the river with such incredible swiftness, that almost at the same instant the enemy seemed to be both at the woods, and in the river, and amongst us. And with the same nimbleness did they advance up the hill toward our camp, and those who were employed in the works.

XX. Cæsar had all parts to act at once: the red flag was to be hung out, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms: the signal to be given by the trumpet: the soldiers to be drawn off from the works: those to be recalled, who had gone to some distance with a design to fetch materials for the rampart: the army to be ranged in order of battle: the men to be encouraged: and the watch-word to be given. A great part of which, shortness of time, and the sudden approach and furious charge of the enemy, prevented. Under these difficulties, two things were of advantage (to the Romans,) first, the skill and experience of the soldiers; because having had much practice in former battles, they could no less aptly suggest

to themselves what was necessary to be done, than be informed by others: and next, whereas Cæsar had forbid the several lieutenants to stir from the works, and their respective legions till the camp should be fortified: These, on account of the near approach, and nimble motion of the enemy, did not now mind Cæsar's orders; but of themselves executed what appeared proper.

XXI. Cæsar having given the necessary orders, ran about to encourage his men wherever fortune threw them in his way; and came to the tenth legion. Where having encouraged the soldiers by no further speech, than entreating them to keep up the remembrance of their wonted bravery, not to be terrified, and valiantly to withstand the assault of the enemy; because the enemy was at no greater distance, than a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for joining battle. And going to another part of the army, with a design likewise to encourage them, he found them already fighting. Such was the shortness of time, and so bent upon fighting were the minds of the enemy, that time was wanting not only for regulating the ensigns, but even for putting on the helmets, and pulling the covers off the targets. On whatever part of the army any one by chance lighted as he came from the works, and on whatever standard he first cast his eye, at this he took his station: that he might not lose the time to be employed in fighting, in seeking out his own company.

XXII. The army being drawn up, rather as *the situation* of the ground, and declivity of the

hill, and exigency of the time permitted, than as the rule and order of the art-military required: whilst the legions were making head against the enemy, some in one place and some in another, and the view of the fight was intercepted by thick hedges that intervened, as we formerly observed; proper reserves could neither be posted, nor provision made of what was needful in every quarter, nor all the necessary orders given by one person. Wherefore, upon such a disadvantageous situation of affairs, various events of fortune also ensued.

XXIII. The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they were posted in the left part of the army, after throwing their darts, quickly drove from the higher ground to the river, the Atrebates (for these had fallen in their way) breathless with running and fatigue, and covered with wounds, and pursuing them with their swords, as they endeavoured to pass the water slaughtered a great part of them, whilst entangled. They themselves did not hesitate to cross the river; and having advanced forward to a place of disadvantage, renewing the battle, they again put to flight the enemy that had turned back and opposed them. In like manner in another quarter, two different legions, the eleventh and eighth, having broken the Veromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the river. But then the whole camp almost on the front and left side being left exposed, when the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it; all the

Nervii in a very close body, with Boduognatus as their leader, who had the chief command, advanced towards this quarter; part of whom began to attack the legions on the open flank, and part to make toward the highest part of the camp.

XXIV. At the same time our horse, and the light-armed foot, that were joined with them, who I said were broken upon the enemy's first attack, as they were retiring to the camp, met the enemy full in the face, and again fled off to another quarter: and the servants of the army, who from the Decuman gate and top of the hill had observed our men with victory on their side cross the river, going out with a design to plunder, when they looked back, and saw the enemy going up and down in our camp, in great confusion betook themselves to flight: at the same time a cry and shriek arose among those who were coming up with the baggage; and away they ran in great fright, some one way, some another. With all which events the cavalry of the Treviri were greatly alarmed, whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come to Cæsar, having been sent by their state to his assistance, and when they observed our camp filled with great numbers of the enemy, that the legions were hard pressed and almost enclosed, that the servants of the army, the horse, the slingers, and Numidians, were flying off different ways and in scattered parties on all sides, giving up our affairs for lost, they made for home: and reported to their countrymen, that the Romans were broken and routed, and that the

enemy had made themselves masters of their camp and carriages.

XXV. Cæsar, after encouraging the tenth legion, proceeded to the right wing; where he saw that his men were overcharged, and, that the standards of the twelfth legion being huddled together into one place, the soldiers were crowded so thick as to be a hindrance to one another in fighting; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer cut off, and the ensign lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts being either wounded or killed; among these P. Sextius Baculus, a soldier of the first rank, a very valiant man, was covered with so many and so dangerous wounds, that by this time he was not able to stand; the rest were turned languid, and some after being abandoned by those in the rear, were slipping out of the field, and avoiding the darts; and that the enemy, though advancing from the lower ground, were not slacking in the front, and pressed hard on both flanks, and matters were now in a critical situation, and no succours, that could be sent; whereupon Cæsar, snatching a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear, (for he had come hither without one), advanced to the first line, and calling the centurions by name, and having encouraged the rest of the soldiers, ordered them to advance the standards, and widen the manipuli, that they might use their swords with greater ease. Upon whose approach, hopes of victory being infused into the soldiers, and their courage renewed, whilst every one for his own part in the presence of his general, and now in this desperate juncture of affairs, was

eager to exert his utmost efforts, the fury of the enemy was a little repressed.

XXVI. Cæsar, when he saw that the seventh legion, which had halted hard by, was likewise overpowered by the enemy, desired the Tribunes of the soldiers to unite the two legions by degrees, and, having turned the standard, to attack the enemy. Which being done, as they were assisting one another, and under no fears of being surrounded by the enemy in the rear, they began to make a bolder stand, and fight with greater courage. In the mean time, the soldiers of the two legions, that had been left in the rear as a guard to the baggage, doubling their pace upon the news of the battle, were discerned by the enemy on the top of the hill: and T. Labienus, having made himself master of the enemy's camp, and observing from the higher ground, what was doing in our camp, detached the tenth legion to our relief. And when they understood by the flight of the cavalry, and the servants, in what posture our affairs were, and in how great danger both the camp, and the legions, and the general were, they made all possible dispatch.

XXVII. Upon their arrival such an alteration of affairs ensued, that our men, even those who had dropt down quite covered with wounds, renewed the fight, leaning against their targets: the servants of the army also, observing the enemy under great consternation, rushed even without arms upon their armed adversaries; and the cavalry, to wipe off the ignominy of their flight by gallant actions, in all places of the battle thrust themselves in before the legionary soldiers

But the enemy, even when they had little hopes of getting off safe, displayed such prodigious courage, that, after their foremost ranks had fallen, those in the next ranks got up upon them as they lay on the ground, and fought standing on their dead bodies; these again being overthrown, and their carcases heaped on one another, those who survived discharged thence, as from a mount, their weapons upon our men, and catching our darts, returned them: so that we ought to conclude it was not for nought that men of such bravery had adventured to cross a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a place of great disadvantage; all which, though extremely difficult, their greatness of spirit rendered easy.

XXVIII. This battle being ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii brought almost to utter destruction, their old men, who together with the boys and women we said had been drawn together into islands and fens, upon the news of this battle, thinking nothing could withstand the conquerors, and that nothing was secure to the vanquished, by the consent of all that remained, dispatched ambassadors to Cæsar, and surrendered themselves to him; and in recounting the calamities of their country, they affirmed that their senators were reduced from six hundred to three persons: and from sixty thousand men to scarcely five hundred, that could bear arms: whom Cæsar, that he might appear to use clemency toward the miserable and submissive, most carefully preserved; ordered them to occupy their own country and cities; and commanded their

neighbours to restrain themselves and their friends from offering them injuries and ill usage.

XXIX. The Aduatuci, of whom we spoke above, when they were coming with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, upon the news of this battle, returned home after they were upon the road: and deserting all their other towns and forts, conveyed their whole effects into one city, that was well fortified by situation. And although this had very steep rocks and precipices on all sides round about, yet there was left upon one side an entrance of an easy ascent, not above 200 feet in breadth: which place they had fortified with a double wall of a prodigious height: upon the wall also they placed stones of a considerable weight, and sharp stakes. These people were descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni; who, when they were making an incursion into our province, and into Italy, having lodged on this side the Rhine such carriages as they could not drive along, and carry with them, left six thousand of their men to take care of and guard them. These, after their overthrow, having been harassed for many years by their neighbours, one while making war upon others, another while defending themselves, at last concluding a peace by the joint consent of all, made choice of this place for a settlement.

XXX. And, upon the first approach of our army, they made frequent sallies from the town, and engaged with our men in slight skirmishes: but after they were inclosed with a rampart of *twelve feet* in height, and fifteen miles in compass, and a great many forts, they kept them

selves within the town. When, upon erecting of the vineæ, and throwing up a mount, they observed a turret rearing up at a good distance, at first they fell a scoffing from the walls, and upbraided the Romans, by speeches, crying "to what purpose was such a huge machine set up at such a distance? with what hands, or with what strength, did they expect to bring forward a turret of such a bulk to the walls, especially as they were men of such low stature?" (for our short stature is often matter of derision to the men of Gaul, in comparison to the largeness of their bodies.)

XXXI. But when they saw it moving, and approaching to the walls, being astonished at the strange and unusual sight, they sent ambassadors to Cæsar to treat about a peace; who spoke to this effect: "That they were of opinion, the Romans carried on the war not without the assistance of the gods; who were able to push forward engines of such a height with so much swiftness, and told him they resigned themselves, and all they had, to his disposal: one thing they begged, and entreated; if peradventure out of his clemency and mercy, which they had heard of from others, he should determine to save the Aduatuci, that he would not rob them of their arms. That almost all their neighbours were their enemies, and envied their valour; against whom they would not be able to defend themselves, after delivering up their arms. That it would be better for them, if they were to fall under such calamity, to suffer any usage from the Roman people, than to be put to death in th

way of torture by those, among whom they had been accustomed to command."

XXXII. To this Cæsar replied: "That he would save their city, more in compliance with his usual manner, than on account of their deservings, if they surrendered themselves before the battering ram touched their walls; but that there could be no terms of surrender, unless their arms were delivered up; that he would do with them, as he had done in the case of the Nervii, and would command their neighbours not to offer any injury to the subjects of the Roman people." The matter being reported to their countrymen, they said they would do what was ordered. Accordingly a great quantity of arms was thrown over the wall into the trench, that was without the town, insomuch that the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of the wall and rampart; and yet about a third part was concealed, and reserved in the city, as was afterwards discovered; whereupon the gates being opened, they enjoyed peace for that day.

XXXIII. Toward evening Cæsar ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to withdraw from the city, that the townsmen might not receive any ill usage from the soldiers in the night. But they, as was afterwards understood, having entered into a plot beforehand, because a surrender being made, they imagined our men would draw off their guards, or at least keep them to their duty with less care, about the third watch, suddenly made a sally from the town with all their forces, on the side where the ascent to our fortifications appeared the least

difficult, partly with those arms which they had reserved and concealed, and partly with shields made of bark, or framed of wicker, which (as the shortness of the time required) they had hastily covered with hides. A signal being quickly given by fires, as Cæsar had ordered beforehand, the soldiers came running thither from the neighbouring forts: and the fight was maintained by the enemy with as much vigour, as it ought to have been by men of courage, in the last hopes of safety, and upon disadvantageous ground, against those who were discharging their weapons from the rampart and turrets; seeing that all their hopes of safety depended on their bravery alone. About four thousand of their men being slain, the rest were forced back into the town. The day after, Cæsar, having broken up the gates, nobody now defending them, and introduced our soldiers, exposed to sale the whole spoils of the city. The number of 53,000 persons was reported to him by those who had purchased them.

XXXIV. At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom with one legion he had sent against the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which are maritime states, and lie upon the (Atlantic) ocean, that all these nations were brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people.

XXXV. All Gaul being subdued by these expeditions, so great a fame of this war was spread among the barbarians, that ambassadors were sent to Cæsar from those nations, who liv

beyond the Rhine, who promised "they would give hostages, and submit to orders." Which embassies Cæsar, because he was hastening for Italy and Illyricum, ordered to return to him the beginning of next summer. Accordingly he set out for Italy, after leading the legions into winter quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Tarones, which were the states adjacent to the places where he had carried on the war. And for these achievements, upon Cæsar's letter, a public thanksgiving for fifteen days was voted by the senate; an honour which before this time had happened to none.

BOOK III.

I. When Cæsar was setting out for Italy, he dispatched Servius Galba with the twelfth legion, and a party of horse, against the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from the confines of the Allobroges, and the lake Lemannus, and the river Rhone, to the top of the Alps. His reason for sending him was, because he wished that a road should be opened along the Alps, through which merchants, with great danger, and paying high imposts, were accustomed to travel. He allowed him to distribute the legion in these places, to winter, if he should think it necessary. Galba, after fighting some successful skirmishes, and taking several of their forts, upon deputies being sent to him from all the country round,

and hostages given him, and a peace concluded, resolved to quarter two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to winter himself with the other cohorts of that legion in a village of the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; which village, situated in a valley, the circumjacent plain not being large, is environed on all sides by very high mountains. And as it was divided into two parts by a river, one part of the village he assigned to the Gauls, the other, left empty by them, he allotted for the cohorts to winter in. This quarter he fortified with a rampart and ditch.

II. After a good many days of the wintering time had passed, and he had ordered corn to be brought in, he was informed on a sudden by his scouts, "that all the people had gone off in the night, from that part of the village which he had assigned to the Gauls, and that the hills, which hang over the village, were taken possession of by vast numbers of the Seduni and Veragri." For several reasons it happened, that the Gauls all on a sudden entered into a design of renewing the war, and cutting off this legion. First, because they despised a single legion, on account of the smallness of their number, and it not very full, two cohorts having been detached to the Nantuates, and several particular parties absent, who had been sent out with a design to fetch in provisions: then again, because they imagined, that their very first assault could not be withstood, on account of the disadvantageous situation of the place, as they were to come running down, and discharge darts from the hills into the valley. To this was added, that they were grieved that their

children should be taken from them under the name of hostages; and they had a firm persuasion, that the Romans were endeavouring to seize upon the summit of the Alps, and unite this country to their neighbouring province in Gaul, not only for the sake of a passage to and from Italy, but also for perpetual possession.

III. Galba, upon receiving this intelligence, as the works of the wintering camp, and fortifications, were not quite finished, nor sufficient provision made of corn, and other stores; because, after a surrender was made, and hostages received, he imagined nothing of war was to be dreaded; quickly calling a council of war, began to ask their sentiments (as to what was proper to be done). In which council, as so much danger all on a sudden and beyond expectation had happened, and by this time almost all the higher ground was seen covered with multitudes of armed men, and none could come to their relief, nor provisions be brought in, the passages being blocked up; almost despairing now of safety, the sentiments of some were delivered to this purpose, that, "leaving the baggage, and making a sally, they should march off for safety, the same way by which they had come thither." It seemed proper however to the greater part, reserving this expedient to the last, in the mean time to wait for the issue of the affair, and defend the camp.

IV. After a short interval, that scarce allowed time to regulate and execute the things which they had concerted for defence, the enemy on a *signal given*, came running down from all *quarters*; and poured in stones and darts upon

the rampart Our men at first, when their strength was fresh, courageously withstood them, nor from their higher station on the rampart did they discharge any weapon without effect: as any part of the camp wanting defenders appeared to be overpowered, thither they flocked, and carried assistance; but in this they were overmatched, that during the long continuance of the skirmish, the enemy as they turned weary retired from the action, and others with fresh vigour came up in their room: none of which things could be practised by our men, on account of the smallness of their number; and not only to one weary was liberty of retiring from the action not allowed, but not even to a wounded person was leave granted to abandon the place where he had his station, and withdraw himself.

V. When now the conflict had been maintained for more than six hours without intermission, and not only strength, but even weapons began to fail on our side, and the enemy were pushing more keenly, and whilst our men turned more remiss, had begun to demolish the rampart, and fill up the ditch, and the matter was now brought to the utmost crisis, P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, who we said had been disabled by a great many wounds in the battle against the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man both of great conduct and courage, came running to Galba, and told him the only chance for preservation was, if they tried the *last resource,* by making a sally on the enemy. *Whereupon, con*vening the centurions, he quickly *orders the soldiers,* " to discontinue fighting for a

little, and only pick up the darts thrown by the enemy, and refresh themselves after their fatigue; and afterward, upon a signal given, to sally out of the camp, and place all their hopes of safety in their bravery."

VI. What they were ordered, they execute; and making a sally suddenly at all the gates of the camp, left it in the power of the enemy neither to know what was doing nor to rally themselves. Whereupon fortune taking a turn, they cut to pieces those, who had conceived hopes of making themselves masters of the camp, being surrounded on all sides; and out of above thirty thousand men, which number of barbarians it was certain had come up to the camp, more than a third part being slain, the rest, struck with great consternation, they put to flight, and suffer them to halt no not upon the tops of the mountains. Thus having routed all the forces of the enemy, and stript them of their arms, they betake themselves to their camp and fortifications. Which battle being finished, as Galba did not incline to try fortune any more, and considered he had come into winter-quarters for one purpose, and saw he had met with other sort of work, but determined chiefly by want of corn and provisions, the day following, after setting fire to all the houses of the village, he set out to return toward the province: and no enemy opposing or interrupting his march, he brought the legion safe to the country of the Nantuates, thence to that of the Allobroges, and there he wintered.

VII. After these achievements, when Cæsar on all considerations imagined Gaul entire

brought under subjection, the Belgæ being vanquished, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alps defeated, and thereupon, in the beginning of winter, had set out for Illyricum, because he inclined to visit those nations likewise, and be acquainted with their country; a sudden war broke out in Gaul. The occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young gentleman, had taken up his winter-quarters with the seventh legion, next to the sea on the Atlantic ocean among the Andes. He, because there was a scarcity of corn in this country, sent out the officers of horse, and several military tribunes, to the neighbouring states, with a design to seek out corn and provisions, amongst which number, T. Terrasidius had been dispatched to the Esubii: M. Trebius Gallus, to the Curiosolitæ; and Q. Velanius, with T. Silius, to the Veneti.

VIII. The potency of this state is by far the most considerable of any of the districts on the whole sea coast, both because the Veneti have a great deal of shipping, with which they have been accustomed to trade to Britain; and so excel the rest in knowledge and experience of naval affairs; and as there are a few sea-ports that lie on this great, tempestuous, and open sea, which they are masters of, they have almost all those for their tributaries who have been accustomed to traffic on this sea. By them first of all were detained Silius and Velanius, because by their means they imagined they would recover the hostages which they had delivered to Crassus. Their neighbours, led by their example (as the

resolutions of the Gauls are sudden and hasty) with the same view detain Trebius and Terrasidius; and quickly sending messengers to each other, they enter into a combination among themselves, by means of their grandees, "that they should do nothing but by public concert, and that they should all share the same issue of fortune;" and they importune the other states "to choose rather to persist in asserting that liberty, which they had received from their ancestors, than endure slavery from the Romans." All the sea-coast being quickly drawn over to their measures, they dispatch a common embassy to Crassus, to let him know, "if he had a mind to receive his officers, he must send back to them their hostages."

IX. Of which proceedings Cæsar is informed by Crassus, and as he was at a great distance himself, he orders in the mean time ships of war to be built on the river Loire, which runs into the ocean, rowers to be procured from the province, and mariners and pilots to be provided. These orders being speedily executed, he himself, as soon as he could for the season of the year, sets out for the army. The Veneti, and likewise the other states, having intelligence of Cæsar's arrival, and withal being conscious what a horrid crime they had been guilty of, in that the ambassadors, a name which among all nations had been always sacred and inviolable, had been detained by them, and thrown into chains: considering the greatness of their danger, prepare for war, and set about the providing of those things chiefly, which serve for the purpose

of shipping; and this they did with the greater hopes, because they depended much on the situation of their country. They knew the entrance by land was cut off to a narrow pass by arms of the sea, and that shipping was pretty impracticable by reason of our want of acquaintance with the coast, and the scarcity of harbours: and they were persuaded our army could not stay long among them, for want of corn; and again, though every thing should fall out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful at sea. They well knew that the Romans had neither any number of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, ports, and islands of the place, where they were to carry on the war: and that the practice of navigation was quite a different thing in a narrow sea, and on the wide and open ocean. Having entered into this resolution, they fortify their towns, convey the corn from the country into the cities: and get together all the shipping they could to Venetia, where it was thought Cæsar would begin the war. They engaged as associates to themselves in this war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menappii: and sent for auxiliaries out of Britain, which lies over against this country.

X. These were the difficulties in carrying on the war, which we mentioned above, but yet many things induced Cæsar to undertake this war; such as, their insolence in detaining the Roman knights, the rebellion raised after a surrender, the revolt after hostages had been given,

the combination of so many states: and above all, lest, upon his neglecting this point, other nations should think themselves at liberty to do the same. Wherefore, as he understood, that almost all the Gauls were fond of revolutions, and were easily and speedily roused to war, and that all men naturally loved liberty and abhorred a state of slavery; before any more states should enter into the combination, he thought proper to divide his army, and distribute it into different quarters.

XI. Accordingly he dispatches T. Labienus his lieutenant with the cavalry to the Treviri, who are situated next to the river Rhine. Him he orders to visit the Remi, and the rest of the Belgæ, and keep them in obedience; and oppose the Germans, if in the way of force they should attempt to cross the river in boats. He orders P. Crassus with twelve legionary cohorts, and a great party of horse, to march into Aquitania, lest from this country auxiliaries should be sent into Gaul, and such powerful nations united. He dispatches Q. Titurius Sabinus his lieutenant, with three legions, to the Unelli, Curiosolitæ, and Lexovii, to take care to keep them disunited. Young D. Brutus he sets over the fleet, and the Gallic vessels, which he had given orders to get together from among the Pictones, and the Santoni, and the other provinces that continued in obedience; and orders him to sail toward the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself marched away thither with the foot by land.

XII. The situation of their towns was generally such, that being built on the extremity

capes and promontories, they neither afforded access by land after the tide had rushed in from the main, which happened always twice in the space of twenty-four hours; nor by shipping, because again upon the ebbing of the tide, the vessels were like to be dashed to pieces on the shallows. Thus by both impediments the storming of the towns was obstructed: and, if perchance at any time the townsmen, mastered by the hugeness of the works, the sea having been excluded by a bank and mounts, and these equal in height almost to the walls of the town, began to despair of their case; bringing up a great number of ships, of which they had prodigious store, they carried off all their effects, and betook themselves to the next towns: and there again defended themselves by the same advantages of situation. This they practised the more easily a great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by storms; and the danger of sailing in that wide and open sea was extremely preat, the tides being strong, and the havens gretty distant from one another, and very few in number.

XIII. For their ships were built and rigged in this manner: Their bottoms were somewhat flatter than those of our vessels, that they might the more easily admit of shallows, and the ebbing of the tide: their forecastles were raised very high, and in like manner were their poops, fitted for the boisterousness of the billows and storms; the ships were built entirely of oak, for enduring any kind of stress and rough handling; the seats for the rowers, being planks of a foot in breadth,

were fastened with iron nails, of the thickness of an inch; their anchors were made fast to iron chains, instead of cables; and in place of sails they had skins, and thin dressed leather, either for want of canvass, and ignorant of its use; or else, which is more probable, because they imagined such a raging ocean, and violent gales of wind, were not to be resisted, and ships of such burden conveniently enough managed by sails of this sort. The conflict our fleet had with these ships was such, that they had the better of them only in nimbleness of motion, and plying of the oars; all other things, considering the situation of the place, and the fury of the tempests, were better fitted and more adapted on their side: for neither could our ships harm them with their beaks (such was their firmness); nor were darts easily thrown into them, on account of their height; and for the same reason were less easily locked in by the rocks. To this was added, that when a breeze began to freshen, and they had suffered themselves to drive before the wind, they could both more easily endure the storm, and ride more safely on the shallows, and when left by the tide had nothing to fear from rocks and shelves: of all which things the hazard was much to be dreaded by our vessels.

XIV. Cæsar, after taking a good many towns, when he found that so much fatigue was undergone to no purpose, that the enemy's escape upon taking the town could neither be prevented, nor damage done them, resolved to wait for his fleet: and when it arrived, and was first seen by th

enemy, about 220 of their ships, well equipped, and provided with all sorts of arms, sailing out of the harbour, drew up over against ours: nor was it clear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or the tribunes of the soldiers and centurions, to whose charge the several ships were assigned, what they should do, or what method of fighting they should use: for they knew that no damage could be done by the beaks; and though turrets were erected on the decks, yet the height of the poops of the barbarians' ships overtopped them; so that from our inferior situation darts could not be discharged with sufficient advantage, and those thrown by the Gauls came down with greater violence. One thing provided by our men was of great service, viz. sharp hooks, clapt on and fastened to poles, in shape not unlike the hooks used in demolishing walls at a siege. When with these the ropes, which fastened the yards to the masts, were seized and stretched, by pushing away the ship with the oars, they were rent asunder; upon the tearing away of which, the yards of necessity dropped down, so that, whereas all the hopes of the Gallic fleet depended on their sails and rigging, these being taken off, the whole use of their ships was taken away at the same time. The remaining part of the dispute depended on courage; in which our men easily excelled, and that the more, as the action was carried on in the sight of Cæsar, and the whole army; so that no exploit any way gallant could escape observation; for all the hills, and rising grounds, from whence there was a near prospect to the sea, were covered with the army.

XV. The sailyards, as we said, being broken down, the soldiers, with the utmost fury, endeavoured to board the enemy's ships, though two or three of their vessels surrounded each of ours. Which after the barbarians perceived to be the case, and after a great many of their ships were taken, as no relief against this misfortune could be found, they endeavoured to obtain safety by flight. And, having now turned their ships toward that quarter to which the wind directed, all on a sudden such a calm and stillness ensued, that they could not stir out of the place. Which accident truly was extremely favourable for putting an end to the affair, for our men pursuing took them one by one, so that but very few of all their number, by the coming on of the night, escaped to land, after they had fought almost from the fourth hour until sunset.

XVI. By which battle was ended the war with the Veneti, and the whole sea-coast: for as all the youth, and also all those of maturer age, who were men of wisdom or high station, had assembled thither, and had also brought together all the shipping, which they any where had; all which being lost, the rest neither knew whither to fly, nor how to defend their towns. Wherefore they surrendered themselves, and all they had, to Cæsar; on whom Cæsar resolved to inflict vengeance the more severely, to the end that the privilege of ambassadors in time coming might be maintained by barbarians with greater care. Wherefore, having put all their senators to the sword, he sold the rest for slaves.

XVII. Whilst these things are doing among

the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus arrives in the country of the Unelli, with the forces which he had received the charge of from Cæsar. Over these Viridovix presided, and held the chief command of all the states that had revolted; from among which he had collected an army, and a mighty force. And during these few days the Aulerci Eburovices, and the Lexovii, having murdered their senators, because they refused to sanction the war, shut their gates, and joined themselves with Viridovix; a vast number moreover of desperate fellows and highwaymen had flocked together from all parts of Gaul, whom the hopes of plunder, and a desire for war, called off from husbandry and daily labour. Sabinus, on a spot convenient for every purpose, kept himself within his camp; whilst Viridovix encamped over against him at the distance of two miles, and drawing out his forces every day, gave an opportunity of battle, insomuch that Sabinus was now come into contempt, not only with the enemy, but was even somewhat upbraided with the banters of our own men: and such an impression of cowardice did he create, that the enemy now had the assurance to come up to the rampart of the camp. He behaved thus on pretence, that he did not think it proper for a lieutenant to engage with such a number of enemies, especially when he was absent who had the chief command, unless on favourable ground, or some advantage given.

XVIII. After confirming this suspicion of *cowardice, he* made choice of a person proper for *his purpose and subtle,* being one of those Gauls,

whom he had along with him as auxiliaries. Him he persuades by large presents and many promises, to go over to the enemy; and instructs him as to what he inclined should be done. Who being arrived among them as a deserter, sets forth the consternation of the Romans: informs them, to what straits Cæsar himself was reduced by the Veneti: and that Sabinus was on the point of drawing his army next night out of the camp privately, and marching away to Cæsar, for his relief. Upon hearing of which, all cried out, that an opportunity of managing their business to purpose was not to be let slip; and that they must needs go to the Roman camp. Many things encouraged the Gauls to this resolution: the hesitation of Sabinus for several days past; the certain intelligence from the deserter; want of victuals, against which provision had been made by them with too little care; their expectation with respect to the war against the Veneti; and that men generally believe a thing that they wish. Spurred on by these motives, they would not suffer Viridovix, and the other officers, to stir out of the council, till leave should be granted by them to take arms, and to go to the camp. Which being granted, they march to the camp in high spirits, as if the victory had been already gained, having provided fascines and faggots, wherewith to fill up the Roman trenches.

XIX. The camp was on a rising ground, and a gradual ascent for about 1000 paces from the level. Hither they posted with great speed, that as little time as possible might be given the Romans to rally and arm themselves, and so they

came up quite out of breath. Sabinus having encouraged his men, gives them the signal, now eagerly wishing for it. Whilst the enemy were much incumbered, by reason of the burdens of fascines which they carried, he orders a sally to be made suddenly at two of the gates. It happened by advantage of situation, by the enemy's want of skill, and their fatigue, by the bravery of our soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they could not bear so much as one shock of our men, and that instantly they turned their backs. And our men in full vigour pursued them impeded, and slaughtered vast numbers of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left few of those who had escaped from the rout. Thus, at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the engagement by sea, and Cæsar of the victory of Sabinus: and all the states immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius. For as the temper of the Gauls is brisk and forward to engage in wars, so their spirit is soft, and unresisting in bearing misfortunes.

XX. Much about the same time, P. Crassus, having arrived in Aquitania, which quarter, as was before said, both for extent of country, and number of people, is to be reckoned as a third part of Gaul, and finding he had a war to manage in the place, where a few years before the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus, upon his army being routed, had been slain, and out of which the proconsul L. Manilius had fled, with the loss of his baggage, thought it behoved him to take more than ordinary care. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries, and cavalry,

besides many men of valour from Tolsa, Carcosa, and Narbo, which are frontier cities of the Roman province in Gaul, who were expressly called up from these parts, he led his army into the confines of the Sotiates. And upon intelligence of their arrival, the Sotiates, having got together a great many forces, and cavalry, in which they were exceedingly strong, attacking our army on their march, engaged first in a skirmish with the horse; afterwards upon their horse being routed, and whilst ours were pursuing, all on a sudden they presented their infantry, which they had lodged in a valley by way of ambuscade. These, falling upon our men, disordered with the pursuit, renewed the battle.

XXI. The fight was maintained a long time, and with great fury; whilst the Sotiates, relying on their former success, imagined the preservation of all Aquitania depended on their gallant behaviour; and our men were ambitious to have it appear, what they were able to do without their general, and without the other legions, with a young man for their leader: the enemy however being quite covered with wounds, turned their backs: a great number of whom being cut off, Crassus in his way began to besiege the capital city of the Sotiates: and when these made a stout resistance, he erected vineæ and turrets. After having one while attempted to make a sally, and another while digged passages under ground to the mount and vineæ, in which practice the Aquitani are extremely skillful, because with them there are in many places mines of brass; when they found that, by reason of the industry of our men

no advantage could be gained by these means, they sent deputies to Crassus, and begged that he would admit them to a surrender. Upon obtaining which request, being ordered to deliver up their arms, they complied.

XXII. And whilst the attention of all our men was fixed on this affair, Adcantuannus, who had the chief command, at another quarter of the town, with 600 sworn friends, (whom they call Soldurii: whose custom is, to enjoy all conveniences of life in common with those, to whose friendship they had given up themselves: and if any thing disastrous befall them, either to share the same fortune with them, or kill themselves: nor as yet in the memory of man has any one been found, who refused to die, upon his being cut off, to whose friendship he had devoted himself:) with these I say, Adcantuannus attempted to make an elopement, but a shout being set up at that part of the works, upon the soldiers running to arms, and after a smart skirmish on the spot, he was driven back again into the town, but obtained however from Crassus, to be allowed the same terms of surrender.

XXIII. Crassus having received their arms, and hostages, marched away to the confines of the Vocates and Tarusates. But then the barbarians being much enraged, upon finding that a city fortified both by the nature of its situation, and by art, was taken within a few days after the arrival of the Romans, began to dispatch *ambassadors* into all quarters, to enter into a *confederacy*, to give mutual hostages, and levy *forces*. Deputies are also sent to those states,

which belong to Hither Spain, and border on Aquitania; auxiliaries and officers are asked thence, on whose arrival they endeavour to carry on the war with mighty ostentation, and with a vast number of forces. And those are chosen commanders who had been along with Q. Sertorius during all the years of his wars in Spain, and were reputed to have the greatest knowledge in military affairs. These, after the manner of the Roman people, began to seize on places of advantage, to fortify their camp, and cut off our men from provisions. Which when Crassus perceived, and considered, that his forces could not safely be divided on account of the smallness of their number, and that the enemy might spread abroad, and beset the passes, and yet leave a sufficient garrison in their camp; that corn and provisions on that account could less conveniently be brought in to him; and that the number of the enemy was daily increasing: he thought it proper not to delay, but have the matter brought to a decisive battle. And having proposed the affair to a council of war, when he found they were all of the same opinion, he appointed the day following for the battle.

XXIV. Wherefore, drawing out all his forces by dawn of day, after having ranged them in a double line, and disposed the auxiliaries in the midst; he waited to see, what resolution the enemy would take. But they thought they fancied that on account of their numbers, and their ancient reputation in war, and the small number of our

men, they might engage with safety, yet thought it safer, by blocking up the passes, and intercepting convoys, to obtain a victory without any wound at all: and if the Romans for want of provisions should begin to make a retreat, they resolved to attack them impeded in the march, and under their baggage, and whilst they were dispirited. This resolution being approved of by the officers, though the Roman army was drawn out, they kept themselves within their camp. Crassus, after perceiving the design, and whilst the enemy being intimidated with the shifting conduct of their leaders, and the suspicion thence conceived, had rendered our men more eager for engaging, and exclamations among all were heard, that they must not be any longer waited for, but that they would go to the camp; (Crassus, I say,) having encouraged his men, marched away, all desiring it, to the enemy's camp.

XXV. There, whilst some were filling up the ditch; and others, by throwing a multitude of darts, forced the defenders from the rampart and the works, and the auxiliaries, whom Crassus, as to the matter of fighting, did not much trust, by carrying stones and darts to the soldiers, and bringing turf to the mount, made the appearance and show of men engaged: and whilst the enemy were fighting with constancy and intrepidity, and their darts thrown from the higher ground, were coming down not without doing execution; the horse having taken a turn round the enemy's camp, brought word to Crassus, that the camp

was not fortified with the same care on the side of the Decuman gate, and would afford an easy entrance.

XXVI. Crassus, beseeching the cavalry-officers to animate their men with considerable rewards and promises, informs them what he thought fit to have done. They, as had been ordered, leading out four cohorts, that having been left by way of garrison in the camp, were quite free from fatigue, and bringing them about by a longer way, that they might not be observed from the enemy's camp, and whilst the eyes and minds of all were fixed on the engagement, quickly arrived at that part of the rampart which we mentioned, and having demolished it, took their station within the enemy's camp, before it could with certainty be perceived or discovered by them, what was being done. And then, a shout being heard from that quarter, our men, with renewed vigour, as is generally wont to happen upon the hopes of victory, began to charge with greater fury. The enemy being every where surrounded, and their affairs all in a desperate condition, made strong efforts to jump over the rampart, and seek safety by flight. Whom the cavalry having pursued in a wide extended plain, and out of the number of 50,000, which number it is certain had flocked together from Aquitania and from among the Cantabrians, having left scarcely a fourth part, returned late at night to the camp.

XXVII. Upon the news of this battle, *the greatest* part of Aquitania surrendered *to Crassus*, and voluntarily sent him hos-

tages: among which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, Preciani, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Garites, Ausci, Garumni, Sibuzates, and Cocosates. A few of the most distant states neglected to do this, trusting to the season of the year, because winter was at hand.

XXVIII. Much about the same time Cæsar, though the summer was now almost spent; yet, because the Morini and Menapii, who were in arms, remained untouched, after all Gaul was subdued, and had never sent deputies to him, to treat about a peace: and thinking this war might soon be finished, conducted his army thither: but they had resolved to manage the war in quite another manner, than the rest of the Gauls had done. For, because they knew that the most potent states in Gaul, which had engaged in battle with the Romans, had been routed and vanquished, and as they had in their country continued woods and fens, thither they conveyed themselves, and all their effects. At the entrance to which woods when Cæsar arrived, and had begun to fortify his camp; and no enemy in the mean time appeared; all on a sudden, whilst our men were scattered up and down on their respective services, they sallied out from all parts of the wood, and made a violent assault upon us. But our men quickly took to arms; and drove them back into the woods; and, after having killed a great many of them, by pursuing too far among the thickets, lost a few of their men.

XXIX. During the few days of summer that remained, Cæsar resolves to cut down the woods,

and, that no assault might be made upon the soldiers in their flank, while unarmed and not aware of the danger, all the timber that was cut down, he applied and disposed by way of fence against the enemy, and piled it up on both flanks instead of a rampart. But after a great deal of ground was cleared with incredible dispatch in a few days, and when now the enemy's cattle and the baggage in their rear were seized by our men, and they themselves had retired to the thicker parts of the wood; such storms came on, that the undertaking was of necessity laid aside, and the soldiers by reason of the continued rains were no longer able to lie in tents covered with skins. Wherefore, having laid all their country waste, and burnt their villages and houses, Cæsar led back his army, and settled his men in winter quarters among the Aulerci, and the Lexovii, and the other states that had made the last insurrection.

BOOK IV.

I. During the winter that followed, which was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls, the Germans called Usipetes, and also the Tenchtheri, with a vast number of people, crossed the river Rhine, not far from the sea, into which the Rhine flows. The reason of their crossing the Rhine was; because having been harassed for several years by the Suevi, they were oppressed with war, and hindered from following husbandry. The nation of the Suevi is

by far the greatest, and the most warlike of all the Germans. They are said to have an hundred cantons: out of which for the purpose of war, they send yearly from their country a thousand soldiers for each canton, the rest, who stay at home, maintain both themselves and them. These again the year after in their turn are in arms; and those stay at home. Thus neither husbandry, nor the art and practice of war, are neglected: but with them there is no private and separate property of ground: nor is any one allowed to continue longer than a year in one place, by way of residence: nor do they live much on corn, but for the most part on milk and flesh, and are much employed in hunting: which circumstance, both by the nature of their food, and their daily exercise, and free manner of life (for having been accustomed from their infancy to no employment or discipline, they do nothing at all contrary to inclination) both improves their strength, and makes them men of a huge stature of body. And to such a custom have they brought themselves, that in the very coldest places they have no clothes except skins, by reason of the smallness whereof a great part of their body is bare, and they bathe in rivers.

II. Merchants are admitted among them, to the end rather that they may have chapmen to whom they may sell what they take in war; than that they want any thing to be imported to them. Nay, even the working cattle, in which the Gauls take the greatest pleasure, and which they purchase at a high price, the Germans do not use when imported; but the ill-shaped and ugly

creatures, that are bred among themselves, these by daily exercise they bring to endure the hardest labour. In an engagement of cavalry they frequently jump off their horses, and fight on foot; and accustom their horses to stay still in the same spot, to which, when there is occasion, they retreat with great nimbleness; nor according to their fashions is anything esteemed more shameful, or silly, than to use saddles. Accordingly they have the courage, though they be but few, to make head against any number of cavalry using saddles. They do not suffer wine to be imported to them at any rate, because by it they imagine men are rendered too soft and effeminate for enduring toil.

III. They reckon it the highest honour to their nation, that the countries on their border lie waste for a great way round: for by this is shewn, that a vast number of nations are not able to withstand their valour. Accordingly the country on one side of the Suevi is said to be desolate for about 600 miles. On their other side are the Ubii, whose country, considering the condition of the Germans, was large and flourishing, and who are somewhat more refined than those of the same descent, and the rest of the Germans; and that because they lie on the Rhine, and merchants come very frequently among them, and that they are accustomed, by reason of their neighbouring situation, to the manners of the Gauls. When the Suevi had often tried these in many wars, and by reason of the largeness and potency of their state, could not expel them from the country, yet they made them their tri-

butaries, and reduced them to a much lower and weaker condition.

IV. In the same case were the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, whom we mentioned above, who for a good many years made a stand against the oppression of the Suevi: at last, however, being forced from their country, and having wandered through many places of Germany for three years together, they came to the Rhine: in which quarter the Menapii dwelt, and had lands, houses, and villages, on both banks of the river. But being affrighted at the arrival of such a number (of foreigners,) they withdrew from the dwellings, which they had on the other side of the river; and planting guards on this side the Rhine, endeavoured to hinder the Germans from crossing. And they, after trying all methods, as they could neither dispute their passage by force, for want of shipping, nor get over clandestinely on account of the guards of the Menapii, pretended that they were returning into their own settlements and country; and, after having proceeded three days march, returned back again; and this whole journey being performed by their cavalry in one night, they cut off the Menapii while unapprised and not aware of the danger, who having been informed by their scouts of the retreat of the Germans, had gone back, without any apprehension, to their villages beyond the Rhine. Having put these to the sword, and seized their vessels, they crossed the river, before the rest of the Menapii, who were quiet in their habitations on this side the Rhine, had notice of the matter; and taking possession

of all their houses, fed themselves the remaining part of the winter with their provisions.

V. Cæsar having intelligence of these proceedings, and fearing the fickleness of the Gauls, because they are easily moved to take resolutions, and generally fond of novelty, thought nothing was to be entrusted to them. For it is the manner of the Gauls, to force travellers to stop even against their will; and inquire what each of them has heard or learned of any affair; and in towns the common people flock round merchants and oblige them to declare from what countries they have come, and what news they know of there. And impressed with these rumours and reports, they often enter into measures with respect to affairs of the highest importance: of which they must needs quickly repent: since they are led by uncertain reports: and most people tell them stories contrived to gratify their humour.

VI. Which custom being known, Cæsar, that he might not be exposed to too heavy a war, sets out for the army earlier than he had been used to do. Upon his arrival, he found the thing had happened, which he had imagined would come to pass: that embassies had been dispatched by some of the states (of Gaul) to the Germans; and that they had been invited to come off from the Rhine; and assured that every thing that they desired should be provided for them. The Germans, buoyed up with these hopes, were now strolling abroad more at large, and had arrived at the confines of the Eburones, and Condrusi, who are under homage to the Treviri.

Cæsar, after summoning the princes of Gaul, thought proper to take no notice of the things of which he had been informed; and therefore having soothed and confirmed their minds in their allegiance, and ordered them to furnish some horse, he resolved to carry on the war with the Germans.

VII. After providing corn, and a select body of horse, he began to direct his march toward the place in which he heard the Germans were, from whom he was distant but a few days' march: from whom deputies arrive, whose speech was as follows: "That the Germans did not make war upon the Roman people first; nor would they avoid however to dispute with them in arms if provoked; because it was a custom of the Germans, handed down from their ancestors, whoever made war, to oppose them, not to use entreaties: this however they would acknowledge, that they had come hither against their inclination, having been expelled their own country. If the Romans wished for their friendship, they might be useful allies to them: and let them either assign them lands, or suffer them to keep what they had taken possession of by force of arms: that to the Suevi only they would submit; to whom even the immortal gods could not be a match; that there were none else upon earth, whom they were not able to conquer."

VIII. To this Cæsar replied what he thought proper, but the conclusion of his speech was: "*that he would* have no alliance with them, if *they continued* in Gaul; and that it was not

reasonable, that they who had not been able to defend their own country, should seize upon that of others: that there were no lands lying waste in Gaul, that could be given away, especially to such a number of people, without wronging the inhabitants: but they might, if they pleased, settle in the country of the Ubii: whose ambassadors he said, were present with him, and were complaining of the oppression of the Suevi, and entreating assistance from him. And that he would give orders to the Ubii on this head."

IX. The deputies said, "they would report this to their countrymen; and, having consulted the matter, would return the third day after to Cæsar:" and in the mean time begged, "he would not approach nearer them with his army." Cæsar replied: "that even this could not be granted;" for he had got notice, that a considerable party of horse had been sent by them some days before this over the Maese toward the Ambivariti, with a design to plunder and forage. And he imagined these horse were expected back, and that the delay was proposed on that account.

X. The Mease rises from Mount Vosegus, which is in the territories of the Lingones, and having received from the Rhine the branch that is called Vehalis, it forms the isle of the Batavi, and not above eighty miles from it, it falls into the ocean. But the Rhine has its rise among the Lepontii, who dwell on the Alps, and flows with a rapid current for a long way through the territories of the Sarunetes, *Helvetii*, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Tribuci, *and Treviri*: and, upon its approach to the sea

divides into several branches, and having formed many large islands, a great part whereof are inhabited by savage and barbarous people (among whom are those, who are supposed to live on fish, and the eggs of wild fowl) it flows by several mouths into tho ocean.

XI. When Cæsar was not above twelve miles from the enemy, the deputies, as had been agreed, returned to him: who meeting him upon his march, earnestly entreated him not to proceed any further. When they could not obtain this, they begged him "to dispatch a messenger to the cavalry, that had marched away before the army, and keep them from fighting; and allow them time to send deputies to the Ubii: and declared if their princes and senate would pledge their faith by oath, they would accept the offer that was made by Cæsar: and desired he would grant them the space of three days to negociate this affair." Cæsar imagined all this tended to the same purpose, that, during the interval of three days, their horse, that were absent, might return: he told them however that "he would not proceed further than four miles that day, and that on the account of water: and ordered as many of them as possible to wait on him next day, that he might examine into their demands." In the mean time he dispatches messengers to the officers, that had marched away before with all the cavalry, to enjoin them not to provoke the enemy to fight: and, if they were attacked, to maintain their ground, till he came up with the army.

XII. But the enemy, as soon as they saw our cavalry, of which there was the number of 5000,

though they had not above 800 horse; because those, that had gone a foraging over the Mease, were not yet returned: and whilst our men were under no fears, because their deputies a little before had gone away from Cæsar, and this day had been demanded by them for a day of truce, making a furious onset, quickly disordered our troops: and again upon our men rallying, they jumped, according to their usual way, from their horses to their feet; and stabbing our horses in the belly, and throwing down a great many of our riders, they put the rest to flight; and so plied them under the panic, that they did not stop in their flight, till they were come within sight of our army. In this skirmish 74 of our cavalry were slain. Among these was Piso of Aquitania, a man of great courage, and descended of a very noble family, whose grand-father had formerly been possessed of the sovereign power in his own country, and had been called friend by our senate. Whilst he was endeavouring to relieve his brother that was enclosed by the enemy, and had rescued him from danger; he himself being thrown from his wounded horse, made a brave resistance as long as he could. But being surrounded on all sides, after receiving many wounds, he fell: and his brother, who had now got out of the field, observing this at a distance, putting spurs to his horse, rode in among the enemy, and was killed.

XIII. This skirmish being ended, Cæsar now judged it proper neither to give audience to deputies, nor admit of offers from a people, who after suing for peace in the way of trick a

artifice, had made war without provocation. And to wait till the enemy's army should be reinforced, and their cavalry return, he deemed to be the height of madness: and as he knew the fickle temper of the Gauls, he could guess, what a mighty reputation the enemy already by this one skirmish would have acquired among them: to whom he was of opinion no time ought to be allowed for concerting measures. After having come to a resolution as to these points, and the design being agreed upon with his lieutenants and questor not to let slip any opportunity of battle; a very lucky accident happened, for next day in the morning a considerable body of the Germans, consisting of all their grandees and elderly men, pursuing the same methods of treachery and dissimulation, came to the camp to Cæsar; at the same time, as was pretended, to excuse themselves for having engaged the day before in a skirmish, contrary to what had been agreed, and they themselves had requested; and withal to obtain a truce by fraudulent conduct, if they could. And Cæsar being much pleased that they were fallen into his hands, ordered them to be detained; after this, he drew all his forces out of the camp; and enjoined the cavalry, because he imagined they were daunted with the late skirmish, to follow the army.

XIV. Drawing up his army in three lines, and quickly performing a march of eight miles, he arrived at the enemy's camp, before the Germans could perceive what was being done, who, being unexpectedly alarmed by every circumstance, both with the quickness of our approach,

and the absence of their own grandees, and their having time neither to concert measures, nor repair to arms, were confounded, not knowing whether it would be better to lead out their forces against the enemy, or defend their camp, or endeavour to seek safety by flight. Whose consternation being discovered by their noise and hurry, our men, enraged on account of their treachery the day before, rushed into the camp; those of them that could readily get hold of their arms, made a stand against our men for a little, and joined battle among their cars and carriages, but the remaining multitude of boys and women (for with all that were theirs they had quitted their home, and crossed the Rhine) every where began to fly, in pursuit of whom Cæsar dispatched the cavalry.

XV. The Germans, upon hearing a noise behind them, and seeing their relations put to the sword, throwing away their arms, and abandoning the military standards, rushed out of the camp: and when they were come to the concourse of the Maese and Rhine, despairing of any further escape, after a great number were cut off, the rest threw themselves into the river, and there perished, being borne down with fear, weariness, and the force of the stream. Our soldiers were all safe to a man, and very few wounded, who, after the terror of such a war was thus removed, the number of the enemy being 430,000, returned to the camp. Cæsar granted those, whom he had detained in his camp, leave to depart. But they being afraid of hard treatment and torture from the Gauls, whose countr

they had harassed, replied, that they inclined to continue with him. And Cæsar gave them leave to do so.

XVI. The war with the Germans being ended, Cæsar for several reasons resolved to cross the Rhine; of which the most sufficient was, that, since he observed the Germans were so easily induced to come over into Gaul, he wished that they likewise should be brought under fears for their own concerns at home; upon their finding, that the army of the Roman people both were able, and had the courage to cross the Rhine. And to this was added that the party of horse belonging to the Usipetes, and Tenchtheri, who, I said above, had crossed the Maese in order to plunder and forage, and were not present at the battle, had retired after the defeat of their countrymen into the confines of the Sigambri beyond the Rhine, and had united themselves with them. To whom when Cæsar sent messengers, to require them to deliver up to him the men that had raised a war against him and Gaul, they made answer, "that the Rhine bounded the empire of the Roman people: if he did not think it just for the Germans to pass into Gaul without his consent, why did he claim authority or power in anything beyond the Rhine?" And the Ubii, who alone of all the people beyond the Rhine had sent deputies to Cæsar, had entered into an alliance, and delivered hostages, earnestly requested him "to come to their assistance, because they were grievously oppressed by the Suevi; or, if he was hindered from doing this by affairs of state, that at least he

would transport his army over the Rhine: that this would be sufficient for their assistance at present, and ground of hope for the time to come; that such was the character and reputation of his army, even among the remotest nations of the Germans, acquired by defeating Ariovistus, and by battle lately fought, that they might be secured against ill usage (from their neighbours) by the fame and friendship of the Roman people." They engaged to furnish a great number of vessels for transporting the army.

XVII. Cæsar, for the reasons which I have mentioned, resolved to cross the Rhine: but neither thought it safe enough, nor deemed it for his own reputation, or that of the people of Rome, to pass it by shipping. Wherefore, though the difficulty of making a bridge appeared to be exceedingly great, on account of the breadth, rapidity, and depth of the river, he was of opinion, however, that this ought to be attempted, or otherwise the army not to be transported. He contrived this form of a bridge: At the distance of two feet he joined a pair of timber posts of a foot and a half square, made somewhat sharp towards the lower end, and of a length proportioned to the depth of the river. Having let down these into the river with engines, he fixed them in the bottom, and drove them down with wooden mallets, not quite perpendicularly, after the fashion of a stake, but in a declining and sloping manner, so as to lean *down* the stream. And opposite to these he *set* up another pair of posts joined after the

same manner, at the distance of forty feet, r
clining back against the stream and current a
the river at the bottom. Both these *doubl*
posts were kept to this position: on the lowe
part, by two braces on each side, beams of two
feet square being let down above for as far as
the division between these logs was separate:
one of which braces being above and the other
under the beam, and made fast to opposite
sides of the posts, such was the firmness of the
work, and such the structure of the parts, that
the more impetuous the stream rushed on, the
closer were the joints knit together. These
beams were joined together by straight planks
laid over them, and these again were covered
with lath and hurdles: and besides all this there
were stakes driven into the water, obliquely
below the bridge, which, being placed by way
of buttress, and connected with all the parts
of the work, sustained the force of the cur-
rent: and there were also others placed at a
proper distance above the bridge: that, in case
trunks of trees or vessels were sent down the
river by the barbarians, to destroy the work,
the force of such things might be lessened
by these fenders, that they might not hurt the
bridge.

XVIII. Within ten days after the timber
began to be carried down from the woods, the
army was transported, the whole work having
been finished within that time. Cæsar, leaving
a strong guard at each end of the bridge
marched away into the country of the Sigam
bri. In the mean time ambassadors came up

him from several nations, to whom, upon their suing for peace and friendship, he returned a gracious answer, and ordered hostages to be brought him. But the Sigambri, the moment the bridge began to be built, having taken flight by the advice of that party of the Tenchtheri and Usipetes, which they had sheltered among them, had quitted their country, and carried off all their effects, and hid themselves in deserts and woods.

XIX. Cæsar having staid a few days in their country, and having burnt their towns and buildings, and cut down their corn, retired into the territories of the Ubii, and having promised them his assistance in case they were harassed by the Suevi, he was informed by them as follows: "That the Suevi, after they found by their scouts, that the bridge was being built, having called a council, according to custom, had dispatched messengers to all parts of their nation, requiring the inhabitants to remove from the towns, to convey their children, wives, and all their effects into the woods: and all that were able to bear arms, to meet together in one place: That this was chosen near about the middle of the provinces, which the Suevi possessed; and that here they had resolved to wait the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle." Which when Cæsar understood, as he had accomplished all the purposes for which he had taken up the resolution to transport his army, namely, to strike a terror into the Germans, to be revenged upon the Sigambri, and to deliver the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi, having spent just eightee

days beyond the Rhine; and thinking he had gained sufficiently, both as to honour and interest, he returned into Gaul, and cut down the bridge.

XX. Cæsar, during the short portion of summer that remained, notwithstanding the winters in those parts are early, because all Gaul lies toward the North, yet resolved upon an expedition into Britain, because almost in all the wars of Gaul, he found assistance had been furnished to our enemies from thence: and, though the time of the year should not serve for carrying on a war, yet he thought it would be of great advantage to him, if he could but visit the island, learn the nature of the people, and get acquainted with their situation, ports, and landing places: all which were in a great measure unknown to the Gauls. For rarely does any one except merchants go over there: nor even to them was any thing known, except the sea-coast, and the parts that are over against Gaul. Wherefore, after having called up the merchants to him from all parts, he could neither learn what was the extent of the island; nor who, or of what power, the nations were that inhabited it, nor what experience they had in war, or what sort of government they used: nor what were the proper harbours for a number of large ships.

XXI. Wherefore to make a discovery of these things, he dispatches C. Volusenus, with a *sloop of war*, thinking that this was proper to be *done, before* he made an attempt (to transport the *army.)* *Him* he orders, after having narrowly

viewed every thing, to return as soon as possible. He himself marches away with the whole army to the confines of the Morini; because from thence was the shortest passage into Britain. Hither he orders ships to come up from all parts of the neighbouring provinces, and the fleet which he had built the former summer for the war with the Veniti. In the mean time, his design having been discovered, and told to the people of Britain by merchants, deputies came over to him from several provinces of the island, who promised to deliver hostages, and submit to the government of the people of Rome. Cæsar, having allowed them an audience, after promising kindly, and encouraging them to continue in that resolution, sends them away home, and along with them one Commius, whom he had made king of the Atrebates, after they were conquered, being a man whose courage and conduct he was pleased with, and whom he took to be faithful to himself, and whose influence was reckoned considerable in that part of the world. Him he orders to visit as many provinces as he could; and encourage them to come under allegiance to the people of Rome; and acquaint them that he would speedily arrive among them. Volusenus, having viewed the country as far as was in the power of one who durst not go ashore, and trust himself to barbarians, returns the fifth day to Cæsar, and tells him what he had discovered *there.*

XXII. Whilst Cæsar stays in these parts in *order to* equip a fleet, deputies came to him

from a great many cantons of the Morini, *to* apologise for their conduct in time past, *who* confessed with regret, that being a barbarous set of mortals, and not acquainted with our way of doing, they had made war upon the Roman people, and they (now) promised to comply with orders. Cæsar thinking this had fallen out very luckily for him, because he did not incline to leave an enemy behind his back; and had not leisure to prosecute a war, on account of the advanced season of the year; and did not think the being employed in such trifling affairs was to be preferred to his design on Britain, orders them to deliver a large number of hostages. Which being brought, he received them into his protection. Having provided and got together about eighty ships of burden, which he thought would be sufficient for transporting two legions: all the galleys he had besides, he distributed to the quæstors, lieutenants, and other officers. To these were added eighteen ships of burden that were wind-bound eight miles from this place, so that they could not get into the same port with the rest. These he assigned to the cavalry, and the rest of the army he committed to the care of his lieutenants, Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, to be led into the country of the Menapii, and into those cantons of the Morini, from which deputies had not come up to him. He ordered his lieutenant, P. Sulpi*cius Rufus, to* keep possession of the port with *such a garrison* as he thought was sufficient for *hat purpose.*

XXIII. These matters being settled, and the

weather being favourable for sailing, he loosed about the third watch, and ordered the cavalry to march to the more distant port, and there embark, and follow him: by whom as this order was executed somewhat slowly, he arrived by himself on the coast of Britain, with the first squadron, about the fourth hour of the day; and there observed the enemy's forces in arms displayed to view on all the hills. The situation of which place was this: the sea was so hemmed in by steep rocks, that a dart could have easily been thrown from the higher ground to the shore. Wherefore, thinking this by no means a proper place for landing, he waited at anchor, for the rest of the fleet coming up, till the ninth hour. In the mean time having called together the lieutenants and military tribunes, he both told them what intelligence he had got from Volusenus: and what he would have them do: and put them in mind that the nature of military business, and especially sea-affairs, (as being subject to quick and wavering motions,) required that every thing should be executed by them at a nod, and in an instant. After they were dismissed, finding both wind and tide favourable at the same time, and having given a signal, and weighed anchor, he sailed forward about seven miles from this place, and stationed the fleet upon an open and level shore.

XXIV. But the barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans, sending forward their cavalry and chariots, which they had been accustomed to use for the most part in fighting, and following after with the rest of their army, en

deavoured to hinder our landing. And indeed there was great difficulty in the case, on the following accounts, viz. because our ships, by reason of their large size, could not be stationed, but in deep water, and our soldiers in places they were strangers to, and whilst they could not have the free use of their hands, and were borne down with a bulky and heavy load of armour, had at the same instant to jump out of the ships, stand among the billows, and engage with the enemy: whereas they either on dry land, or wading but a very little into the water, having the free use of all their limbs, and on ground they were well acquainted with, could boldly cast their darts, and spur up their horses that were accustomed to such ways of action. By which difficulties our men were dismayed, and being entirely strangers to this way of fighting, they did not all shew the same briskness, and eagerness, that they had been wont to shew in conflicts on dry land.

XXV. Which when Cæsar perceived, he ordered the galleys, the form whereof was somewhat strange to the barbarians, and which upon service were pretty nimble in their motions, to be removed a little from the transport-vessels, and rowed away with oars, and stationed toward the open flank of the enemy, and the enemy from thence to be beat off, and forced away from the shore, by slings, arrows, and engines: Which contrivance was of mighty service to our men. For the barbarians being much surprised, both at the make of our galleys, and the motion of our oars, and our strange kind of engines, made a pause; and presently after retreated a little.

And whilst our men hesitated about venturing on shore, chiefly on account of the depth of the sea: the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, imploring the gods, that the thing might turn out luckily for the legion: "Fellow-soldiers," said he, "jump out, unless you have a mind to give up your eagle to the enemy. I at least shall perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general." Having said this with a loud voice, he leaped overboard, and began to advance the eagle toward the enemy. Upon this our men, animating one another, to prevent such a signal disgrace, jumped every one out of ship: and those of the neighbouring ships in the first line observing them, followed their example, and marched up against the enemy.

XXVI. The conflict was maintained on both sides with great vigour. Our men, however, as they could neither keep rank, nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as some from one ship, some from another, joined any ensign that came in their way, were put in great disorder. But the enemy being well acquainted with all the shallows, when from the shore they observed any single persons coming out of a ship, putting spurs to their horses, they would set upon them while impeded in the water: a great number would surround a few; and others at an open flank would shower in darts upon multitudes. Which when Cæsar observed, he ordered the galleys, long boats, and the spy sloops to be manned: and sent them to the relief of those whom he saw *in distress.* Our men, as soon as they got footing *on dry ground*, and their fellows were all com

up, made a brisk charge upon the enemy, and put them to flight; but could not pursue them far, because our cavalry had not been able, by reason of a storm, to make good their course, and reach the island. This alone was wanting to complete Cæsar's wonted success.

XXVII. The enemy being vanquished in battle, so soon as they recovered themselves after their flight, immediately sent deputies to Cæsar to treat about peace: they promised to give hostages, and submit to orders. Along with these deputies came Commius the Atrebatian, who, I said above, was sent over by Cæsar into Britain. Him they had seized at his landing, thrown into chains, though as an ambassador he was carrying his general's message to them; but now, after the battle was fought, they set him at liberty; and in their suing for peace laid the blame of that outrage upon the mob, and begged it might be forgiven, on account of their ignorance. Cæsar complained, that, after suing for peace from him of their own accord, by sending deputies into the continent of Gaul, they had made war without any reason, but said he pardoned their ignorance, and ordered them to give hostages: part whereof they delivered instantly, and part that was sent for from places at a distance they said they would deliver within a few days. In the mean time they ordered the people to return to their farms: and their grandees came up from all parts, and began to put themselves and their country under Cæsar's protection.

XXVIII. A peace by these means being concluded on the fourth day after the arrival of the

Romans in Britain, the eighteen ships, of which mention was made above, that had taken the cavalry on board, made loose from the upper port with a gentle breeze; but when they had well nigh reached Britain, and were seen from the camp, such a storm arose all on a sudden, that none of them were able to keep to their course: but some of them were carried back to the same place from whence they came, and others were driven, with great danger, to the lower end of the island, that lies nearer to the setting of the sun: which yet, after casting anchor, as they were like to be filled with water, were obliged again to put out to sea in a stormy night, and stood away for the continent of Gaul.

XXIX. The same night it happened to be full moon: which usually occasions very high tides in the ocean; and this our mariners were strangers to. Accordingly at the same time the tide filled the galleys, which Cæsar had employed in transporting the army, and which he had hauled up to dry ground: and the storm was dashing about the vessels of burden, that were riding at anchor: nor was it at all in our power either to manage them, or to do any service. Thus, several ships being staved to pieces, and the rest rendered useless for sailing, by having lost their cables, anchors, and other tackle, a mighty confusion throughout the whole army ensued; a thing that must needs happen: for there were no other vessels to carry them back again; and all materials, that are necessary for repairing ships, were wanting, and, as every one knew we behoved to

winter in Gaul, corn in this country against winter had not been provided.

XXX. Upon notice whereof the grandees of Britain, who had come up after the battle was fought, to submit to Cæsar's command, entered into a concert among themselves, and as they knew that cavalry, and ships, and corn were wanting to the Romans, and could guess at the paucity of their soldiers by the smallness of the camp; which too was narrower than usual, because Cæsar had transported the legions without any baggage: they thought the thing best to be done was, to make a rebellion, and cut off our men from corn and provisions, and protract the affair till winter, because they were persuaded that upon their being vanquished, or precluded from returning, none afterward would come over into Britain with a design to make war. Wherefore, having again entered into a conspiracy, they began by degrees to withdraw from the camp, and privately call up the inhabitants from their farms.

XXXI. But Cæsar, though he had not as yet got notice of their design, suspected however, both from the fate of his fleet, and from their having delayed to deliver the hostages, that the thing would come to pass, which happened. Wherefore he made provision against all events, for he was daily carrying corn from the fields into the camp; and made use of the timber and brass of the vessels that were most shattered for repairing the rest: and what else was necessary *for this purpose*, he ordered to be brought from *the continent* of Gaul. Wherefore, as the matte

was managed with the utmost care by the soldiers, twelve ships only being lost, the rest he made fit for sailing.

XXXII. Whilst these things are doing, one legion, which was called the seventh, being sent out to forage, according to custom, and there being till this time no suspicion of rebellion, since part of the natives continued at their farms, and part were coming and going to and from our camp, those who were on guard before the gates of the camp, acquainted Cæsar, that a greater dust than usual appeared in that quarter toward which the legion went. Cæsar suspecting, what was really the case, that some new plot was hatched by the barbarians, ordered the cohorts, that were on guard, to march along with him to the place, two others to mount guard in their stead, the rest to take arms, and follow him in all haste. Having marched a little farther from the camp, he observed his foragers overcharged by the enemy, and scarcely able to stand their ground, and the legion being crowded close together, darts were poured in upon them from all sides. For as there was but one field left, all the corn of the other fields being cut down; the enemy guessing our foragers would come hither, had skulked during the night in the woods, and then set upon them when scattered, and when they had laid aside their arms, and were busy in reaping, and having killed a few, the rest, not regularly disposed in ranks, they put in great disorder: and at the same time surrounded them with their horse and chariots.

XXXIII. The manner of fighting from

chariots is this: in the first place they drive round to all quarters, and cast darts, and with the very terror caused by their horses, and the rumbling noise of their wheels, they generally disorder the ranks: and having wrought themselves in betwixt the troops of the cavalry, they jump out of their chariots, and fight on foot. Their drivers in the mean time retire a little from the action, and so station themselves with the chariot, that, in case they be overpowered by the enemy's numbers, they may have a free retreat to their friends. Thus in battles they equal the swiftness of cavalry, and the firmness of infantry: and by daily experience and practice become so expert, that they are accustomed on sloping and steep ground, to check their horses at full gallop, and quickly manage and turn them, and run along the pole, and rest on the harness, and from thence with great nimbleness leap back into the chariot.

XXXIV. In which case, as our men were put in great confusion by this new way of fighting, Cæsar in good time brought assistance: for upon his approach the enemy made a pause, and our men recovered from their fright. After which, thinking it an improper time to act offensively, and engage in battle, he kept his ground; and, after a short interval led back the legions to the camp. Whilst these things are doing, and whilst our men were all employed, the enemy who were left in the fields, went off. A storm for several days together ensued, which both confined us to the camp, and restrained the enemy from hostilities. In the

mean time the barbarians dispatched couriers to all quarters; and informed the people how small a number of men we had; and told them what a fine opportunity offered for getting booty, and making themselves free for ever, if they could force the Roman camp. By these means having quickly raised a vast number of foot and horse, they came up to our camp.

XXXV. Cæsar, though he foresaw the same thing would come to pass, that had happened on former occasions, that the enemy, in case they were routed, would escape danger by nimbleness of heels; yet having got about thirty horse, which Commius the Atrebatian, of whom mention was made before, had transhipped along with him, he drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp. Battle being begun, the enemy were not able long to sustain the fury of our soldiers, and accordingly turned their backs: whom our men pursued over as great a space as they were able by their speed and strength, and slaughtered a great number of them; and then, having demolished and burnt every thing a great way round, they returned to the camp.

XXXVI. The same day deputies, sent up by the enemy, came to Cæsar to treat about a peace. Cæsar doubled upon them the number of hostages that he had formerly required; and ordered them to be brought over to the continent (of Gaul); because, the time of the equinox being at hand, and his vessels crazy, he did not think it proper that his voyage should be put off till near winter. Wherefore, finding the weather favourable, he made loose his ships

little after midnight: which got all safe to continent; but two of the transports not be able to make the same port that the rest a landed somewhat lower on the coast.

XXXVII. Out of which two vessels, as t soldiers, being about 300, came ashore, an were going to march for the camp; the Morin whom Cæsar, upon his going over to Britain had left in a peaceable disposition, spurred on by the hopes of booty, surrounded them at first with not a great number of their men, and ordered them, if they had not a mind to be cut to pieces, to lay down their arms. But when they, forming themselves into a round body, stood to their defence, immediately upon the noise, about 6000 men came flocking up. Upon intelligence whereof, Cæsar dispatched all the cavalry from the camp to the relief of his men. In the mean while our soldiers sustained the enemy's charge; and fought with the utmost bravery upwards of four hours: and having received only a few wounds, slaughtered a great many of them. But after our cavalry appeared in view, the enemy, throwing away their arms, turned their backs; and a great number of them were slain.

XXXVIII. Cæsar the day following sent his lieutenant T. Labienus, with the legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini, who had made the revolt. Who having no place to retreat to, because the fens were dried up, (which they had used by way of protection the year before) fell almost all into the power of Labienus. But the lieutenants Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had conducted th

legions into the country of the Menapii, after laying waste all their fields, cutting down their corn, and burning their houses, returned to Cæsar; for the Menapii had all hid themselves in the thickest parts of the woods. Cæsar appointed winter-quarters for all the legions among the Belgæ. Thither only two provinces sent hostages from Britain: the rest neglected it. For these achievements, upon Cæsar's letter, a public thanksgiving for twenty days was voted by the senate.

THE END.

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